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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE DECEMBER 2003 DECISION  
Less than two years ago, the world became a safer place.  Libya, a long-time thorn 
in the side of the West, announced that it would abandon its weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) programs.  In the historic announcement on December 19, 2003, Libya pledged 
to destroy its chemical and nuclear weapons programs, declare its nuclear activity to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), eliminate its longer range missiles, and 
destroy its chemical stockpiles.  Additionally, the country promised to sign the Additional 
Protocol of the IAEA, and allow immediate monitoring and inspections to ensure its 
compliance.1  These positive steps came in the wake of Libya’s apparent abandonment of 
state-sponsored terrorism.  In 1999, Libya handed over the two main suspects in the 1988 
terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103 and the 1989 bombing of French flight UTA 
772.2  Additionally, the North African nation made United Nations mandated payments to 
families of the victims. 
In return, the United States and the international community pledged to drop 
sanctions against Libya and work to welcome the country back into the international 
community.  In the year and a half following the announcement, Libya seems to be 
making good on its promises. After onsite inspections in January 2004, several key parts 
of the Libyan WMD program had been removed for safekeeping within the United States.  
The pieces included nuclear centrifuges, a uranium conversion facility, blueprints for 
nuclear weapons, uranium hexafluoride (yellow cake), and guidance kits for SCUD-C 
ballistic missiles.  Further inspections in March 2004 verified that Libyan authorities had 
destroyed thousands of unfilled chemical munitions and safeguarded 24 metric tons of 
mustard gas that the country had produced over the years.3  Inspectors have been unable 
to uncover any concrete evidence of a Libyan biological program, and Libyan officials 
 
1 Sharon Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, “Disarming Libya:  Weapons of Mass Destruction,” CRS Report 
RS21823, 22 April 2004, 1-2.
2 Clyde R. Mark, “Libya,” CRS Issue Brief IB93109, 17 March 2005, 3. 
3 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 31 March 2005), 252.  Hereafter referred to as Intelligence Capabilities Report.  Squassoni and 
Feikert note in their report to Congress that the blueprint was of a first generation Chinese fission bomb.  
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deny having any knowledge of more than a program in the initial planning stage.4  In 
perhaps the most telling of overt gestures on the part of the long-time pariah, Libyan 
leader, Muammar al-Qadhafi, recently told his government that the United States is not 
his enemy and that one day the two countries could become friends.5  Friendly relations 
are now well within reach. 
The United States and the international community are rewarding Libyan action 
with far greater acceptance into mainstream politics and the global economy.  Just a few 
months after Libya’s WMD pledge, the United States re-established diplomatic presence 
in the former rogue nation.  As of September 2004, President Bush had ended almost all 
of the economic sanctions against Libya.6  Libya remains on the state-sponsored terrorist 
list and is therefore subject to some lingering mandatory sanctions.  Nations on this list 
cannot purchase military equipment, weapons, or dual-use items.  However, negotiations 
may soon remove Libya as a state-sponsor of terror if some outstanding payments are 
made to families of the Lockerbie bombing.7
This giant shift in Libyan policy is quite significant.  Joseph Cirincione notes, “It 
marks the first time in almost 30 years that any nation has ended such a program without 
a change in regime.”8  Additionally, this shift in action comes from a country that has 
been an avid sponsor of harmful terrorist activities and alienated itself from the United 
States and its allies.  Beyond its obvious historical significance, Libya’s decision to 
abandon its WMD programs carries more important implications for a world where 
nonproliferation efforts face rising and possibly insurmountable challenges.  If the 
significant causal factors leading to Libya’s turnaround can be properly identified, then 
there is a greater likelihood that the United States may be able to successfully employ 
them towards other would-be proliferators.  Just as importantly, well-informed policy-
 
4 Intelligence Capabilities Report, 255-56.  The intelligence community thought that Libya was actively 
pursuing an offensive biological weapons program.  Inspections and interviews have left these suspicions 
unconfirmed. 
5 Mark, “Libya,” 1. 
6 President George W. Bush, Executive Order, 20 September 2004.  This order rescinded several 
emergency executive orders placing sanctions on air travel, aircraft purchases, freezing Libyan assets as 
well as other economic measures.  Order found at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040920-5.html
7 Mark, “Libya,” 2.   
8 Joseph Cirincione, “The World Just Got Safer, Give Diplomacy the Credit,” Washington Post, 11 January 
2004. 
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makers will know to be cautious before applying the Libyan model to any situations 
where the conditions that led to success in the Libyan case are not present.   
This chapter briefly gives background on the country of Libya.  It then discusses 
the characteristics of the Libyan WMD program.  Next, it introduces and discusses the 
causal debate concerning Qadhafi’s renunciations and previews the remaining chapters.  
Finally, it briefly presents the major findings of this work. 
B. LIBYA: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Libya is a large North African country located on the Mediterranean Sea.  It 
shares borders with Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger, Sudan, and Tunisia.  The country has a 
population of 5,765,563.  The Libyan economy depends heavily upon income from its oil 
sector which is made up of both oil and natural gas.  Oil exports account for nearly all of 
Libya’s export earnings and approximately 25 percent of GDP. Oil revenue and the 
country’s relatively small population provide Libya one of the highest per capita GDPs in 
Africa.  However, little of this income flows down to the lower classes of the nation. 
Qadhafi took power in 1969 following a successful coup and has remained in 
power ever since.  Almost immediately, Qadhafi instituted his own political system 
known as the Third Universal Theory. The system combines socialism and Islam derived 
drawing on tribal practices. In theory, it is implemented by the Libyan people using 
"direct democracy."  In practice, Qadhafi runs a strictly authoritarian government.  
Qadhafi considers himself a revolutionary and visionary leader. He used his substantial 
petroleum wealth in the 1970s and 1980s to try and spread his ideology beyond Libya’s 
borders. He supported subversives and terrorists outside of the country to facilitate the 
end of Marxism and capitalism. In 1973, he initiated military operations in northern Chad 
to both gain access to minerals and influence Chadian politics.  In 1987, Libya retreated 
from Chad.9  
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LIBYAN WMD PROGRAM 
1.   Oil=Money=Influence:  Why pursue WMD? 
Libya’s association with WMD began soon after the 1969 coup that brought 
Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi to power.  From the very beginning of his dictatorship, 
 
9 CIA World Factbook, “Libya,” http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ly.html, September 
2005.  All facts in this section come directly from this website. 
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Qadhafi, “had ambitions to become the leader of the Arab world and to raise Libya’s 
prestige among Islamic and other Third World countries,” notes Cirincione.10  Qadhafi 
chose conventional firepower, international terrorism, and WMD to achieve these goals.  
By the late 1980s the colonel realized that conventional power and terrorist activities 
were not nearly as effective as he had hoped.  Qadhafi steadily isolated himself from the 
Western world without the increase in clout and prestige among his Arab neighbors that 
he had so doggedly worked for.  Most likely, the other Arab nations saw him more as a 
liability than a strong regional role-model.  He subsequently began to rely more heavily 
on WMD to further his strategic aims. As a result of these setbacks, Qadhafi placed 
greater emphasis on a potentially volatile strategy.  He chose to begin developing WMD.  
Qadhafi saw these types of weapons as critical in establishing himself as a leader of the 
Arab world.  Additionally, he hoped that these efforts would give his nation prestige 
among Islamic and other Third World nations.  In order to sell his intentions to his Arab 
neighbors, Qadhafi used Israel for his rationale.  He explained that the Arab world needed 
a nuclear capability to match that possessed by the Israelis. 
Libya’s motivations for possessing WMD are a very important piece of 
understanding why the nation decided to abandon its programs.  In other words, different 
instruments of U.S. national power targeted these motivations in specific ways.  
2.   What Was the Nature of the Libyan WMD Program? 
Due to lack of indigenous capability, the Libyans relied heavily on outside 
sources to build their WMD programs.  Cirincione writes, “[Libya’s] substantial oil 
wealth enable[d] it to buy the technology it need[ed] rather than developing its own.  Its 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon programs [were] heavily dependent on foreign 
technology and expertise.”11  Still, Libya did achieve some substantial WMD 
accomplishments.  Arguably, the most successful of Libya’s WMD programs was its 
chemical weapons capability.  Indeed, the majority of Western intelligence successes 
prior to 2003 centered on exposing Libyan efforts in chemical weapon production.  In 
1988, the United States publicly released the existence of the Rabta chemical production 
 
10 Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, (Washington D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 305. 
11 Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, 305. 
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facility.12  International pressure forced the country to move production and storage to the 
larger and better camouflaged facility at Tarhunah.  This facility was exposed by the 
British in 1994 and former CIA director John Deutch called it, “the world’s largest 
chemical weapons plant.”13  After, Libya’s 2003 policy shift, U.S. and British inspections 
catalogued the true capabilities of the program.   The Rabta and Tarhunah facilities 
contained 23 tons of mustard gas, several thousand unfilled weapons, and sophisticated 
equipment with the capability to manufacture mustard gas as well as Sarin and Tabun.14  
While this was a scary and substantial amount of chemicals, it represented a more modest 
program than some states, such as the Soviet Union, had achieved.  Lack of a more robust 
capability was most likely due to a lack of necessary precursor substances and 
technological know-how.   
The West knew less about Libya’s nuclear program than its chemical program 
prior to 2003.  A 1999 report from the CIA noted that, “Libya would need ‘significant 
foreign assistance’ to develop nuclear weapons.”15  The existence of a 10 megawatt 
research reactor built by the Russians in Tarjoura was well-documented.  Also, Libya 
openly tried to purchase nuclear weapons from China.16  However, estimates placed 
Libya as far from achieving a nuclear capability.  Post-2003 knowledge of Qadhafi’s 
nuclear aspirations was more alarming.  Indeed, some senior officials in the Bush 
administration were openly surprised.  “On the nuclear side…my understanding is that 
they did have a much further advanced program, including centrifuges,” noted an 
administration member.17  The program cited by the official included all the necessary 
components for enriching uranium and producing a weapon.  Documents and inspections 
of Libyan sites found P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, enrichment cascades, uranium 
 
12 http://www.nbcdefence.net/nore/me_na1.htm, February 2005. 
13 Joshua Sinai, “Libya’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The Nonproliferation Review 4, no. 3 
(spring/summer 1997), 95. 
14 Squassoni and Feikert, “Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 4. 
15 Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology and 
Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 2000, (Washington D.C.: U.S. GPO, 
2000). 4. 
16 Sinai, “Libya’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 98. 
17 CNN Website, “Bush official: Libya’s nuclear program a surprise,” 
http:///www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/12/19/libya.nuclear. 
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hexafluoride, and even blueprints for an early Chinese nuclear warhead.18  However, 
Libya still lacked the technical expertise to produce the weapons.  Even so, some 
estimates had the country producing a working design in 3-7 years.19  While this 
projection might have been optimistic, the ability of Libya to be that far ahead in the 
program was both surprising and disconcerting.   
Knowledge from both before and after the 2003 policy reversal shows that the 
Libyan biological weapons program was still in very early stages.  Libyan revelations and 
Western inspections confirmed that the country had made no real progress in this area.  
Equipment at its chemical weapons facilities could be used to produce these types of 
agents, but there was a severe lack of technological know-how.  Some reports note that 
Qadhafi tried unsuccessfully to recruit South African scientists to help with the 
program.20  However basic the biological program was, it is nonetheless important to 
highlight that until 2003, the Libyans were engaged in obtaining the capability. 
In summary, at the time of its WMD renunciation, Libya had managed to 
assemble a considerable amount of WMD knowledge, equipment and some capability.  It 
is fair to assume that given a strong enough desire, Qadhafi would have eventually been 
able to stockpile some substantial WMD.  This may have come with substantial 
diplomatic, economic or political costs, yet it was still achievable.  It therefore becomes 
necessary to explore the major reasons why Qadhafi gave up on 30 years of focused 
effort. 
D.  THE CAUSAL DEBATE 
Why did Libya give up its WMD pursuit?  Debate over this question is both 
heated and varied.  It is a safe bet to say that almost no one thinks that Qadhafi saw the 
error in his ways and suddenly desired to become a benevolent leader.  Instead, there are 
four possible answers.  First, evidence can be presented to show that internal politics and 
lack of WMD successes caused Qadhafi to abandon his quest.  Second, many stress that 
years of economic sanctions finally forced Qadhafi to give up WMD and terrorism in 
order to ensure the fiscal viability of the country.  The toll of these sanctions combined 
 
18 Squassoni and Feikert, “Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 3. 
19 Director, International Atomic Energy Agency. 
20 Sinai, “Libya’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 96. 
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with positive inducements like reintegration into the global arena after years of isolation 
was enough to sway the Libyan cost-benefit analysis.  Third, some point to Western 
intelligence and interdiction successes as the key to breaking the back of Libyan WMD 
efforts.   Finally, it can be argued that Qadhafi saw the invasion of Iraq and the removal 
of Saddam Hussein as a foreshadowing of his own downfall.  In other words, the United 
States used coercive diplomacy to compel Libya to give up its terrorist and WMD 
pursuits.  All of these arguments are at the very least intriguing.  Most of them have at a 
minimum some credible evidence to support them.  However, as was stated before, the 
goal of this research is to identify which of these factors, or which combination of them, 
contributed significantly to Libya’s renunciation. 
1.  Internal Politics and Poor Success Rate:  The Dam Bursts 
Did Libya give up its WMD program due to internal pressures and lack of real 
progress?  To answer this question, one must look at the domestic political situation of 
the country.  Within Libya, there are some Islamic groups which seriously oppose the 
rule of Qadhafi.  Christopher Boucek observes that, “[These groups] have drawn the 
attention of some observers in part due to their ability to tap existing centers of discontent 
within Libyan society.”21  By this line of reasoning, Qadhafi gave up his WMD to 
concentrate on consolidating power within the country.  It follows that he saw the 
spending on these programs as wasteful and potentially destabilizing from within.  His 
goal of using WMD to become a regional power was not achievable and so he needed to 
use the resources to put down his opposition. 
The domestic argument does not stand out as significant for a few reasons.  First, 
Boucek notes that, “Most opponents inside Libya and abroad have been successfully 
silenced.”22  In essence, Qadhafi’s regime has been so repressive that there were no 
credible domestic threats to his power.  Second, the people of Libya probably would not 
tolerate an oppressive Islamic regime.  This type of government would, “likely run 
against the fabric of Libyan society; over 30 years of a repressive regime have exhausted 
much of the public.”23  In other words, the Libyan people would not swap one 
overbearing regime for another.  Additionally, it is somewhat of tautological argument.  It  




                                                
is nearly impossible to show that Qadhafi’s poor domestic economic decisions would 
have alone resulted in such dissatisfaction.  More likely, it was sanctions that stressed the 
economy to begin with.  Finally, the evidence suggesting that Libya realized its WMD 
programs would never work is fairly weak.  Up to the point that Libya received 
assurances of sanction reductions in return for giving up its WMD, it continued to work 
on its programs.  Thus, I consider domestic factors as intervening variables brought about 
by the following external factors. 
2. Sanctions and Inducements:  The Reservoir Dries Up  
A popular and plausible explanation is that diplomatic isolation and economic 
sanctions factored significantly in the cost-benefit calculations of Muammar al-Qadhafi 
and his regime.  Following this line of reasoning, Mr. Qadhafi realized that the benefits of 
procuring WMD were dwarfed by the costs of both political and economic isolation.  It is 
easy to speculate that these costs were either significant or sufficient to change Libya’s 
behavior, but a detailed analysis of the situation is the only way to tell.  It is also 
necessary so that policy-makers can draw on the general conclusions reached in the 
Libyan case.  For instance, there is robust scholarly debate on just which types of 
economic and diplomatic pressures most influenced the Libyans.  Was it the unilateral 
sanctions and hard-line rhetoric of the United States begun under Ronald Reagan in the 
mid-1980s?  Patrick Clawson, in a speech to the House Committee on International 
Relations, stated, “If indeed Libya shows that sanctions work, it shows that unilateral 
U.S. sanctions work.”24  Perhaps it was the UN sanctions and diplomacy that proved to be 
the most effective.  “One of the most important conclusions of the sanctions literature to 
date is the now widely accepted finding that sanctions are most likely to work when they 
are multilateral,” notes Meghan O’Sullivan.25  Quite possibly, both unilateral U.S. actions 
and those that were multilateral in nature contributed significantly to Libya’s decisions. 
Much of the debate concerning the reasons behind the change in Libya’s behavior 
centers on sanctions.  However, another economic and diplomatic dynamic was at work 
in the Libyan case.  The use of positive inducements to spur a change in Libya’s behavior 
 
24 Patrick Clawson , “Libya’s WMD Renunciation: How to Consolidate and Replicate,” Statement to House 
Committee on International Relations, 10 March 2004, 3. 
25 Meghan O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions:  Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism, (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 4. 
9 
                                                
also deserves attention.  Richard Haass notes, “Certainly, engagement does not preclude 
the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments…In practice, there is often 
considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of 
sanctions is used as a positive inducement.”26  Perhaps the termination of the sanction 
regimes of the United States and the UN were a strong enough inducement to sway 
Qadhafi’s cost-benefit analysis.  This argument has substantial evidence to support it and 
thus merits an in-depth analysis. 
3. Intelligence: Everyone Knows the Water is Contaminated 
There are those who argue that Western intelligence and interdiction successes 
were instrumental in forcing Libya to change its WMD policy.  Former Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet observed recently that, “The leverage 
was intelligence. Our picture of Libya’s WMD programs allowed CIA officers and their 
British colleagues to press the Libyans on the right questions, to expose inconsistencies, 
and to convince them that holding back was counterproductive.  We repeatedly surprised 
them with the depth of our knowledge.”27
This argument is plausible for several reasons.  Intelligence successes first 
brought Libya’s chemical weapons exploits to the public’s attention.  International 
pressure forced the Libyan’s to stop their work at one of their facilities and invest in 
another complex.  Later, more pressure was exerted after this facility was discovered.  
Even more recently, successes of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) have been 
highlighted as key to the Libyan case.  In a White House press briefing, a senior 
administration official commented: 
 We’ve believed for some time it was an important victory for the 
Proliferation Security Initiative because the interdiction of the ship, the 
BBC China, which was carrying uranium centrifuge equipment to Libya, 
and was diverted to Italy, when that happened, we think that the 
government of Libya came to the realization that…there wasn’t any 
further point in trying to conceal [its nuclear weapons program].28   
 
26 Richard Haass and Meghan O’Sullivan, Honey and Vinegar, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2000), 2. 
27 George Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context,” Testimony 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 March 2004, 7. 
28 White House press briefing, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040608-19.html.  
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Indeed, the interdiction of the ship was a huge intelligence success.  It gave the 
United States its first real glimpse into the true nature of the Libyan nuclear program.  It 
also exposed Qadhafi to even more international pressure.  Intelligence as a significant 
causal factor is also plausible and well-documented.  It therefore warrants further 
scrutiny. 
4.   Coercive Diplomacy:  We Are Going to Blow Up Your Dam 
 Certainly the most hotly contested explanation for Libya’s policy shift is that of 
coercive diplomacy.  In other words, fans of this reasoning contend that Qadhafi was 
coerced into giving up his WMD by viewing the fall of Saddam Hussein as a vision of 
the future if he continued to oppose the West.  If one looks at the circumstantial evidence 
connected with the case, this becomes a plausible argument.  The Libyans secretly 
approached the Americans and British in March of 2003.  This just happened to be the 
same time as the U.S. led invasion of Iraq.  Indeed, the administration of President 
George W. Bush was quick to attribute Libya’s actions to its policy in Iraq.  President 
Bush observed in his 2004 State of the Union address, “Nine months of intense 
negotiations succeeded with Libya while 12 years of diplomacy with Iraq did 
not…Words must be credible, and no one can now doubt the word of America.”29  The 
obvious meaning of the statement is that the threat of force was the main reason that 
Libya decided to give up it WMD aspirations.  Journalists around the world were split on 
this issue.  Most right-leaning publications attributed Libya’s actions to the Iraq example.  
Most leftist media dismissed the argument as unrealistic.30  Nominee to the job of United 
Nations Ambassador, John Bolton, does not mix words. “I believe the conclusion is 
obvious. As Col. Qadhafi himself put it, weapons of mass destruction now clearly 
‘represent a danger to the country which has them.’”31  
Another aspect of this argument is that Qadhafi had already felt the sting of 
American firepower 17 years earlier.  In 1986, U.S. fighters struck key terrorist targets 
 
29 Martin Indyk, “The Iraq War did not Force Qadhafi’s Hand,” Financial Times, 9 March 2004. 
30 http://globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/libya/wwwh31225.htm, This website lists several dozen 
summaries from major periodicals around the world in reaction to the causes of the Libyan policy change.  
Nearly every right-leaning journal attributes the change to the example of Iraq.  Even the French!  
31 John Bolton (As Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security) presented this 
viewpoint in his testimony to the House International Relations Committee in March, 2004.  
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within Libya.  Qadhafi, himself, narrowly escaped death.32  Having personally been a 
target of American firepower, it is logical to assume that he would take any threats 
against so-called “rogue” states very seriously.  Thus, the Iraq example and real-life 
experience may have significantly influenced Qadhafi’s decision to abandon WMD.  
However, the close link in timing between Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and the Libyan 
WMD pledge could be a coincidence.  Furthermore, Qadhafi did not change his policies 
much after the Libyan raid.  Yet, coercive diplomacy as a causal factor merits detailed 
analysis purely for the fact that it has so much support from high-level policy-makers. 
E. METHODOLOGY, ROADMAP, AND SOURCES 
1. Methodology 
This thesis is a detailed analysis of a single case study.  It views the case through 
different perceptual lenses.  By analyzing the Libyan case through differing and 
sometimes conflicting perspectives, one can draw reasonable general conclusions about 
the true nature of this historic situation.   
2. Roadmap 
Chapter II focuses on the following question.  Were the costs of procuring and 
maintaining WMD too high for Libya?  This chapter focuses on the effects of diplomatic 
pressure and economic sanctions on influencing Libya’s decision.  The chapter will start 
with a historical summary of the diplomatic and economic actions taken against Libya.  It 
then analyzes the effects of these actions using a blending of common theory on the 
subject, and reports on the Libyan economy and diplomatic isolation.  More specifically, 
it identifies which actions were effective and those that were not.  The chapter concludes 
with summarizing the success of these factors and whether or not they actually raised the 
price of WMD to a point that outweighed the benefits gained from it.  Analysis of 
sanctions and positive inducements in this chapter will use and review the current 
literature on the subject by Meghan O’Sullivan, Richard Haass and the comprehensive 
research and findings of Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott and Kimberly Elliot. 
Chapter III examines whether Libya felt that it could not get away with WMD 
procurement. This chapter addresses the significance of U.S. and Western intelligence 
successes and how they may have contributed to Libya’s decision because the country 
 
32 Walter Boyne, “El Dorado Canyon,” Air Force Magazine 82, no. 3 (March 1999). 
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believed that it would not be able to hide its intentions.  It begins by discussing the 
successes of Western intelligence in Libya.  These include uncovering weapons 
production facilities, intercepting medium range ballistic missile shipments and stopping 
the import of nuclear related materials.   
Chapter IV examines whether the threat of military force compelled Libya to 
acquiesce on WMD.  This chapter measures the effects of coercive diplomacy on altering 
Libya’s behavior.  The argument is that threats of becoming like Iraq prompted Libya to 
give up WMD.  This chapter summarizes military action, both directly taken and 
threatened towards Libya.  It then measures their effectiveness based on how the Libyans 
reacted to them.  This chapter reviews and uses the theoretical literature and findings of 
Alexander George, Robert Art and Patrick Cronin in the field of coercive diplomacy. 
Chapter V is the conclusion.  It answers the original research question based on 
the sub-conclusions reached in each of the previous chapters.  Briefly, I find that 
sanctions and diplomacy as well a great intelligence work were significant in persuading 
Qadhafi to give up his WMD programs.  Furthermore, U.S. coercive diplomacy efforts, 
while having some effect, were not significant.  After presenting these findings, I discuss 
important policy and theoretical implication which result from the Libyan case.  Policy-
related implications include the applicability of the lessons-learned from this study to 
other rogue nations like Iran and North Koreas as well as nations considering 
proliferation.  Additionally, I highlight areas of research which require greater scrutiny 
from international relations scholars.   
3. Sources 
In addition to reviewing primary and secondary literature as sources, I incorporate 
data and discussion from congressional records, UN resolutions, and government 
speeches as sources.   
F. FINDINGS  
1. Finding 1:  Sanctions and diplomacy were significant in Libya’s 
WMD renunciation 
Twenty five years of comprehensive unilateral and multilateral sanctions severely 
hampered the Libyan economy.  Although the demand to give up WMD was not 
specified in sanctions until 1996, it is impossible to separate those targeting terrorism and 
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those which included WMD.  Each round of sanctions progressively hurt the Libyan 
economy more and more.  Once UN sanctions were suspended in 1999, the economy and 
oil infrastructure were in such a state of disrepair, that the remaining unilateral sanctions 
carried considerable weight.  U.S. engagement of Libya took advantage of the 
punishment of sanctions and offered Qadhafi a return to the international community and 
a way to reinforce his authoritative grip on his country. 
2. Finding 2:  Intelligence work was significant in persuading Libya to 
renounce its WMD  
The combination of both the moderate effectiveness of intelligence work in the 
1980s and 1990s and the high effectiveness of recent Western counter-proliferation 
efforts rooted in intelligence leads me to conclude that intelligence was significant in 
persuading Libya to renounce its WMD programs.  The Western intelligence community 
formulated an accurate assessment of Libyan actions and programs.  Quality intelligence 
products moved other nations to join the United States in punishing Libyan terrorism and 
proliferation by consistently highlighting Qadhafi’s transgressions.  Finally, intelligence 
actions allowed the United States to be proactive in ultimately halting the Libyan nuclear 
program. 
 
3. Finding 3:  Coercive diplomacy was not significant in Libya’s decision 
to renounce WMD 
The relationship between U.S. coercive diplomacy attempts towards Libya and its 
decision to give up WMD is slightly effective at best.  During the 1980s, U.S. coercive 
diplomacy efforts aimed to end Libyan support of terrorism.  While they did not stop 
terrorism, they showed Qadhafi that the U.S. was willing to use some military force to 
counter wayward Libyan foreign policy.  In the 1990s, U.S. coercive diplomacy attempts 
did nothing to influence Qadhafi.  Their haphazard and random application showed a lack 
of both will and capability.  Essentially, these efforts lacked the necessary credibility.  
The coercive diplomacy attempts of the current administration did not apply directly to 
Libya.  For lack of a better term, I call these efforts blanket coercive diplomacy.  While 
they may have factored in to Libya’s cost/benefit analysis, they were far from decisive.  
Thus, the cumulative effects of coercive diplomacy targeting Qadhafi and Libya were not 
significant. 
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4. Finding 4:  Sanctions and diplomacy as well as good intelligence work 
were the major significant external factors in Libya’s renunciation of 
WMD 
Twenty-five years of comprehensive unilateral and multilateral sanctions and 
diplomatic isolation severely degraded the internal and international reputation of 
Qadhafi’s regime.  Their continuous application weakened Qadhafi and, in time, created 
the conditions which were necessary for Libya to acquiesce on its plans to continue to 
develop WMD.  Once these conditions developed, U.S. engagement and intelligence 
work were able to exploit the internal situation in Libya.  The use of positive inducements 
showed Qadhafi that he could stay in power and better his country if he abandoned 
WMD.  Counter-proliferation efforts by Western intelligence agencies proved to Libya 
that it would not be allowed to continue with WMD proliferation.  The combination of 
these factors sufficiently persuaded Qadhafi that it was more beneficial and less costly to 
rejoin the international community and bring in much needed foreign investment rather 
than pursue WMD. 
5. Policy and Theoretical Implications 
Chapter V presents a detailed discussion of lessons-learned the policymakers 
should take away from the Libyan case.  Additionally, two suggestions are presented for 
future theoretical study and research.  The thesis now turns to a review and evaluation of 
sanctions applied against Libya. 
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II.  POLITICS AND MONEY:  WERE THE COSTS OF 
PROCURING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TOO HIGH 
FOR LIBYA? 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to document the significance of economic sanctions and 
positive inducements in motivating Libya to give up its WMD programs.  I begin with a 
brief history of sanctions levied against the North African state as well as positive 
incentives presented to the regime.  Next, I analyze the effects of diplomatic and 
economic pressure as well as engagement on influencing Libya’s cost-benefit analysis in 
favor of American and international opinion.  I use the most current theoretical studies on 
sanctions and engagement to facilitate this analysis. Finally, I assess the explanatory 
significance of sanctions and engagement in influencing Qadhafi’s decision to abandon 
WMD. 
This chapter finds that diplomacy, sanctions and engagement heavily influenced 
Qadhafi’s cost/benefit analysis.  Years of comprehensive sanctions hobbled the Libyan 
economy while international diplomatic pressure politically isolated Qadhafi.  These 
punitive measures created the necessary conditions for the West to offer incentives in the 
form of renewed relations and suspension of economic blockades that significantly 
persuaded Qadhafi to abandon his proliferation efforts. 
B.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF SANCTIONS 
At the time of Libya’s historic announcement in December 2003, the United 
States had levied over 20 different types of sanctions against the African state.  The 
punitive measures included bans on the transfer of weapons and chemicals, supporting 
organizations that could benefit Libya, importing Libyan oil products, exporting oil 
related equipment, partaking in trade, loans and other transactions and dealing with U.S. 
based Libyan assets.33  Additionally, two different regimes of UN-sponsored sanctions 
denied air travel in and out of Libya, banned the sales of aircraft and related parts, 
prohibited the sales of military items and the sharing of military expertise, froze Libyan 
assets, and banned the sale of oil-related equipment.  The following paragraphs detail the 
 
33 Clyde R. Mark, “Libya,” CRS Issue Brief IB93109, 17 March 2005, 5. 
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timeline and scope of the specific diplomatic and economic measures carried out against 
Libya. 
U.S. relations with Libya soured almost immediately after the 1969 military coup 
that brought Colonel Qadhafi to power.  However, it was not until the beginning of the 
1980s that relations between the two nations completely broke down.  Initial moves 
against Libya contained both diplomatic and economic elements.  On 29 December 1979, 
the United States labeled Libya as a state sponsor of terror.  This designation commands 
four different types of mandatory sanctions.  These sanctions include restrictions on U.S. 
foreign assistance, a ban on the sale and export of defense related items, strict limitations 
on dual-use items, and opposition to loans and aid from international financial 
institutions.34  Within a few months, the American Embassy in Tripoli closed after a mob 
surrounded and burned it.  Interestingly enough, the U.S. Ambassador had been 
permanently withdrawn from Libya since 1973.  The following year, the United States 
shut down the Libyan Embassy in Washington, D.C. as a result of suspected terrorist 
activities within U.S. borders.  In the same year, President Reagan invalidated the use of 
U.S. passports for travel to Libya. 35   
Beginning in 1982, predominantly diplomatic pressure turned to economic 
pressure.  After increasing tension over Libya’s rising support of terrorism, Reagan 
banned the import of Libyan crude oil and the export of oil and refinery equipment.  
Additional pressure came in 1985 when Reagan added refined petroleum products to the 
import ban.36  After terrorist attacks in two European airports were linked to Qadhafi’s 
regime, Reagan again resorted to economic punitive measures.  This time the sanctions 
were much broader in scope.  The Reagan Administration blocked all imports and exports 
with Libya and suspended the commercial contracts of American oil companies.  
Furthermore, Libyan government assets in the United States were frozen.37  The final 
 
34 U.S. Department of State, “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm, August 
2005. 
35 Mark, “Libya,” 7. 
36 Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism, (Washington 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 178. 
37 British Broadcasting Corporation, 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3336/, March 2005.  
Sanction timeline and specifics were found on a BBC website linked with stories about Libya’s 
announcement. 
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U.S. sanctions levied against Libya came in 1996 in the form of the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act (ILSA), or House Resolution 3107.  These so-called sanctions were unique 
and controversial because they targeted third parties that invested in Libya’s oil industry, 
military or aviation capabilities.  The sanctions even gave discretionary power to enforce 
these sanctions against companies or persons who might not be directly linked with the 
infraction.38  The purpose of these sanctions was to create more competitive conditions 
for U.S. firms with foreign companies heavily involved in Libya.  In 2001, Congress 
extended the ILSA as it was due to expire. The terms in the original act remained with the 
exception of one change.  The threshold for triggering automatic secondary sanctions 
lowered from 40 million dollars to 20 million dollars.39   
The list of multilateral sanctions is much shorter.  The first comprehensive effort 
for international pressure against Libya came from the G7 summit in 1986.  Here, leaders 
issued a joint declaration pledging stepped-up efforts against terrorism with particular 
emphasis on Libya.40  The first round of UN sanctions came after the indictments of 
Libyan terrorists in the Pan Am and UTA bombings.  UN Resolution 748 in 1992 doled 
out the first multilateral sanctions against Libya.  This resolution prohibited Libyan 
commercial air traffic, banned the sale of aircraft components and maintenance services, 
and barred the sale of military equipment and associated training.41  In the face of 
continued Libyan resistance, the UN passed Resolution 883 in 1993.  This resolution 
added to the previous UN sanctions by freezing Libyan assets not associated with 
petroleum sales, banning the sale of oil equipment that could be used to expand and 
upgrade Libya’s existing infrastructure, and tightening the aircraft sanctions by targeting 
the Libyan national airline, Libyan Arab Airlines.42
  C. ANALYSIS OF SANCTIONS 
The sanctions and actions listed above, both unilateral and multilateral, were quite 
extensive in nature, and they remained in effect with only minor modifications during 
 
38 United States House of Representatives, H.R. 3107:  Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 104th Cong., 
2nd Sess., 1996, 3-5; Hereafter referred to as ILSA. 
39 United States House of Representatives, H.R. 1954:  ILSA Extension Act of 2001, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., 
2002, 1.  Hereafter referred to as ILSA Extension. 
40 O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, 178. 
41 United Nations Security Council, “UN Resolution 748,” Security Council Resolutions – 1992, 1992, 53. 
42 United Nations Security Council, “UN Resolution 883,” Security Council Resolutions – 1993, 1993, 114. 
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Libya’s 25 years of political and diplomatic isolation.  In order to assess their 
effectiveness, I use a framework developed in recent literature.  I then analyze Libyan 
differentiating them by type and time period. 
1. Method of Analysis 
  There has been much literature on whether or not sanctions work.  Hufbauer, 
Schott and Elliot conclude that sanctions were effective in one third of the many different 
cases they studied.43  The problem with this literature is that it does not predict which 
types of sanctions may be successful or under what conditions sanctions will not achieve 
their goals.  Meghan O’Sullivan’s recent work offers useful tools and methodology to 
analyze the power and effectiveness of different types of sanctions.  Additionally, her text 
contains an in depth look at the Libyan case prior to the 2003 announcement.  By 
incorporating her framework and insight on the Libyan case with other research and 
perspectives, it is possible to answer the question posed at the beginning of this chapter. 
In order to evaluate the success or failure of case specific sanctions, O’Sullivan 
uses four criteria:  impact, effectiveness, utility and comparative utility.44  Impact is “the 
sheer economic or political damage sanctions inflict on the target.”45  For example, 
certain sanctions may result in total or partial collapse of a particular industry within the 
target nation.  Impact, however, does not measure if that collapse helped achieve the 
goals of the sanctions.  Effectiveness is defined as “the extent to which the sanctions 
achieve their goals.”46  A hypothetical example of this would be a sanction on weapons-
related sales to convince a state to stop intervening in the affairs of its neighbor.  If the 
lack of weapons made that state leave its neighbor alone, then it would be effective.  
Utility is “the extent to which sanctions achieve their goals, minus the costs incurred in 
the process.”47  For example, President Carter initiated a grain embargo against the Soviet 
Union to punish it for the invasion of Afghanistan.  However, this grain embargo hurt 
American farmers so badly that Reagan lifted the sanctions when he took office.  The 
cost of sanctions outweighed the benefits.  Therefore, these sanctions had negative utility.  
 
43 Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, (Washington 
D.C.:  Institute for International Economics, 1990), 54. 
44 O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, 29. 
45 Ibid., 29. 
46 Ibid., 29. 
47 Ibid., 29. 
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Finally, comparative utility is defined as “how the utility of sanctions compares with that 
of other policy options; whether sanctions were the best choice open to policymakers at 
the time.”48  In other words, there could be times when using a series of air strikes on a 
target country may have higher utility than that of sanctions, even when the sanctions  
have positive utility.  Comparative utility is the most difficult to measure because it 
requires counterfactual analysis.  However, in cases like Libya where multiple influence 
strategies were in effect simultaneously, comparative utility is easier to measure.  Each of 
these four criteria is an important tool in the analysis of the Libyan case.    
2. Sanctions and Libyan WMD 
Did economic sanctions significantly influence Libya’s decision to give up 
WMD?  The impact of sanctions on Libya is important only in how it aids or hinders the 
effectiveness of the sanctions.  Utility and comparative utility are not as important in 
answering if sanctions were significant.  They are important when thinking about whether 
sanctions are in the sending country’s interest.  The focus here is on the target, however, 
and impact and effectiveness are the criteria which relate to the influence of sanctions on 
Libya’s cost-benefit analysis.  Utility and comparative utility factor into the cost-benefit 
analysis of the United States.  Therefore, I analyze the effectiveness of the different 
sanctions vis-à-vis WMD to determine their significance.  I then measure the utility of 
these sanctions. Comparative utility is measured in Chapter V.  
To understand the effectiveness of sanctions in the Libyan calculus, one must 
look at their impact on the target country in relation to their goals.  Of the several 
different sanctions catalogued in earlier paragraphs, only two sanction regimes had the 
explicit goals of forcing Libya to abandon its WMD programs.  They are the ILSA and 
the ILSA Extension Act of 2001. In reality, the ILSA Extension Act only lengthened the 
time period and refined the threshold for applying the measures contained in the original 
ILSA.  The three stated goals of the ILSA were to, “seek full compliance by Libya with 
its obligations under Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 of the Security Council of the United 
Nations, including ending all support for acts of international terrorism and efforts to 
develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction.”49  In theory, none of the other sanctions 
 
48 O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, 29. 
49 ILSA, Sec. 3, 2. 
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mattered because their goals did not encompass the subject of WMD.  For instance, UN 
Resolution 731 had the explicit goals of, “eliminating international terrorism [and 
compelling] the Libyan government to cooperate fully in establishing responsibility for 
the terrorist acts against Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772.”50  The subsequent UN 
resolutions discussed previously spelled out the sanctions mandated to achieve these 
goals.  The unilateral sanctions of the United States in the 1980s also did not target 
WMD.  These too, were concerned with Libyan support of terrorism and antagonistic acts 
against the United States.  One can then ask if the ILSA of 1996 and its follow-on 
extension of 2001 are the only relevant sanctions worth analyzing vis-à-vis Libyan 
WMD. 
O’Sullivan observes that there are a, “broad range of goals—explicit and implicit, 
primary and auxiliary, initial and subsequent—embraced by various advocates and 
crafters of sanctions over time.”51  If the ILSA and the Libyan state at the time of these 
sanctions existed in a vacuum, then the answer to the question posed above would be yes.  
However, the ILSA came into effect with all of the other sanctions mentioned above in 
full force.  There is no practical way to separate them all.  Had the Libyans not renounced 
their WMD programs after the suspension and ultimate termination of the UN sanctions, 
then the answer would also be more clear-cut.  This, however, was not the case.  In 
reality, the sanctions mandated by the ILSA piggy-backed on those levied before, both 
unilateral and multilateral.  The impact of earlier sanctions was most likely compounded 
by those that followed.  Libya did not care about the goals and senders of the different 
sanctions so much as the effects that these sanctions had on their cost-benefit 
calculations.  It is therefore necessary to measure the impact and effectiveness of all of 
the sanctions to answer this chapter’s guiding question.   
Sanctions do not simply impact the economic situation of the target nation.  
Sanctions can also have political and psychological impact as well.52  As was stated 
earlier, impact does not translate in a linear fashion into effectiveness.  Sanctions that 
have only moderate impact may well be enough to accomplish the goals of the nations 
 
50 United Nations Security Council, “UN Resolution 731,” Security Council Resolutions – 1992, 1992, 51-
2. 
51 O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, 31. 
52 Ibid., 28. 
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using them.  It is the accomplishment of goals that signifies effectiveness, and ultimately, 
success. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze the impact and effectiveness of 
each of the many sanctions placed on Libya.  It is more helpful to analyze the sanctions 
by historical period.  Coincidently, this conveniently divides them into groupings of 
either unilateral or multilateral.  The three phases of sanctions in the Libyan case were 
U.S. sanctions in the 1980s, UN sanctions of the early 1990s, and the ILSA of 1996 and 
its 2001 extension.  Sanctions in the 1980s and those associated with the ILSA and its 
extension are typified as unilateral.  UN sponsored sanctions qualify as multilateral. 
3. Reagan-era Sanctions 
The Reagan-era unilateral sanctions of the 1980s started out gradually and soon 
escalated to a complete embargo.  It is only recently that the majority of them have been 
lifted.53  At face value, it seems that nearly 25 years of economic pressure to produce 
results was anything but effective.  However, sanctions take time.  Richard Haass writes, 
“Sanctions are unlikely to achieve desired results if the aims are large or the time is 
short.”54  The U.S. unilateral sanctions of the 1980s had three important goals.  The U.S. 
wanted to punish Libya for sponsoring terrorism but lacked quality military options.  The 
two remaining goals included building support for multilateral sanctions, and bolstering 
credibility for a military option in the event that sanctions failed to change Libyan 
behavior.55  A major unpublished goal of the Reagan Administration was regime 
change.56  However, history and Qadhafi’s proven ability to weather any storm shows that 
this goal was best left unstated.  The impact of this period of sanctions was both 
economic and political.  O’Sullivan finds that while the sanctions of this time period 
impacted the Libyan government economically, poor internal decision-making and a 
considerable dip in international oil prices probably contributed more to the North 
African country’s economic woes.57  Additionally, several analysts maintain that the 
 
53 Mark, “Libya,” 6.  President Bush dropped all sanctions accept for those related to weapons on 20 
September 2004.   
54 Richard Haass, Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, (Washington D.C.:  Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1998), 197. 
55 O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, 181. 
56 Ibid., 205. 
57 Ibid., 188. 
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economic impact on the oil industry was relatively small.  “U.S. sanctions did not impose 
serious losses on Libya’s oil industry,” notes O’Sullivan.58  In the same paragraph, 
however, she does note that these sanctions made Libya vulnerable to international 
pressure on its energy sector.  Overall, O’Sullivan and other scholars have been less than 
enthusiastic about the economic impact of this period of sanctions.  However, the 
intangible economic effects of these sanctions cannot be neatly charted but are just as 
valuable when analyzing this round of sanctions.  The majority of Libyan oil fields and 
production facilities were originally built by American companies.  The chairman of the 
state-run Libyan National Oil Corporation observed recently, “Oil started here with the 
Americans.  They trained us.”59  While the impact on the Libyan economy as whole may 
fall write in line with O’Sullivan and other’s analysis, the majority of the Libyan oil 
infrastructure remained dependent on U.S. technologies and expertise to remain 
functioning.  The costs associated with the denial of this technology and expertise would 
continue to mount over 25 years.   
4. UN-Sponsored Sanctions 
After international authorities established the link between Libya and the 
perpetrators of the Pan Am and UTA bombings, multilateral sanctions in the form of UN 
resolutions soon followed.  The goals of these were discussed previously, but aside from 
the very specific goal of cooperating in the criminal trials, Libya was told to end its 
support of international terrorism.  O’Sullivan considers these to have had the most 
economic impact of all of the sanctions.  Her research points to the crippling of the 
Libyan airline industry and the greatly reduced ability to refine crude oil products.  As 
with the unilateral sanctions of the 1980s, she finds that the economic impact of the 
multilateral ones may still have been secondary to the continued internal mismanagement 
of the economy and plummeting oil prices.60  The UN-sponsored sanctions impacted the 
Libyan economy more than the U.S sanctions of the 1980s.  However, it is not possible to 
calculate if the impact of multilateral sanctions would be as great if the U.S. sanctions 
had not already existed.  In fact, UN sanctions only further squeezed the chokepoints 
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already targeted by U.S. ones.  It is therefore difficult to say that the UN sanctions had 
more impact than the Reagan-era ones.  The two sanctions regimes worked in concert 
with one another. What is most important, is that the additional lack of technological 
parts and expertise continued to degrade the Libyan oil production capability and disrupt 
its economic infrastructure.   
5. ILSA 
The goals of ILSA included those of the previous periods, but added the need to 
give up the pursuit of WMD.  O’Sullivan is most skeptical of these sanctions.  According 
to the data, the ILSA did not significantly impact the investment pattern occurring in 
Libya.  While this may be true, it did allow the United States to go after the assets of 
foreign companies doing business with Libya.  This strategy most certainly involved 
political costs, but it also served to further deter foreign investment in the country.  
Again, the ILSA sanctions seem to have had an intangible effect on the Libyan case.  
O’Malley correctly notes that after the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999, the Libyan 
economy improved dramatically.61  However, even with the majority of the world free to 




































































Figure 1.   Libyan Oil Production62 
                                                 
61 O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, 203. 
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Other dynamics figured into the equation. Specifically, the Libyans needed 
American expertise to boost their production.  Even with Europeans free to invest in the 
country, oil capacity remained at UN-sponsored sanctions levels.  Some point out that 
Libya did not produce more oil because it wanted to preserve resources and was capped, 
at least in theory, by OPEC quotas.  However, OPEC bases its quotas on the known 
capacity of its producing countries.  In other words, Libya did not curtail its production to 
meet OPEC quotas.  On the contrary, it produced all the oil it could with its decaying and 
outdated technology.  The Department of Energy (DOE) reports that Libya is pushing to 
boost oil production by half a million barrels/day in the next five years and doubling 
output in the next ten.63  Thus, it appears that the ILSA sanctions and the Reagan-era ones 
that preceded them certainly impacted the Libyan regime.  A Libyan oil supervisor noted 
recently, “Everyone’s waiting for the Americans to come back…a lot of infrastructure 
needs to be rebuilt…we’re frozen in the 1970s”64
One more oil-related topic merits consideration when examining the impact of 
ILSA.  Historically, American oil companies take smaller profit shares.  Recently, 11 of 
15 contracts awarded to international competitors to expand Libyan oil production went 
to American firms.  Of the 15, none were awarded to European companies who had 
actually been in Libya even through the sanctions.  Libyan officials awarded the contracts 
based on the attractive terms, working capital and less than 20 percent profit sharing 
associated with the American bids.65  Thus, the lack of lucrative terms and American 
technology and expertise certainly impacted Libya. 
6. Overall Economic Impact 
In summary, 25 years of unilateral and multilateral sanctions measurably 
impacted the Libyan economy.  The sanctions alone did not cause all of Libya’s 
economic woes.  Certainly, fiscal abuses and fluctuating oil prices share much of the 
responsibility.  However, overall economic impact was very real.  Libya’s economy 
stagnated under sanctions when other OPEC countries experience growth.  Figure 2 
compares Libya with Saudi Arabia to illustrate this point.  It would be premature to say 
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that they were effective until one analyzes how the poor Libyan economy impacted 







































Figure 2.   Libyan GDP (Sanction Years)66 
 
7. Political Impact 
Politically, O’Sullivan notes the “impact of sanctions on Libya was considerable, 
particularly over the course of the 1990s once UN sanctions reinforced U.S. ones.”67  The 
impact was great for two important but different reasons.  Sanctions placed Qadhafi in a 
metaphorical vise.  On one side, Qadhafi felt pressure from the international community. 
The longer the sanctions continued, the more politically isolated Qadhafi became from 
the world.  Qadhafi’s attempts to become a regional leader among Arab states and later 
North African states failed.  None of these regional players could afford to be seen as 
cooperating with Libya.  To do so would have meant the loss of their international 
prestige and possible retribution from the United States and the UN.  Thus, Qadhafi saw 
his dabbling with terrorism and WMD procurement backfire for his regional ambitions.  
Mounting internal pressures squeezed the Qadhafi regime from the opposite 
direction.  O’Sullivan observes that, “sanctions helped weaken an important pillar on 
25 
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which Qadhafi’s regime rested:  economic well-being.”68  The implication here is that the 
sanctions began to create discontent within the Libyan population.  As one analyst 
observes: 
For 35 years Colonel Qadhafi has used oil to buy allegiance from Libyans.  
In exchange for their turning a blind eye to the lack of representative 
government and human rights abuses, Colonel Qadhafi is openhanded in 
distributing Libya’s oil proceeds, sometimes as direct gifts to influential 
people and tribal leaders, but also in the form of state-financed health care, 
huge urban development projects and universal free education.  But two 
decades of American and United Nations sanctions diminished Libyan oil 
revenues.  The country’s oil fields were declining, exploration was all but 
halted, and Libya was forbidden to import new oil extraction technology.69
In addition to being unable to fund social projects, Libya experienced a huge 
population rise during the 1990s.70  The economic sting from the loss of oil revenue was 
made worse by having many more mouths to feed.  The economic impact of the sanctions 
worked with and sometimes created political impact on the Qadhafi regime.  With the 
level of and types of impact defined, it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
Libyan sanctions. 
D.   HOW EFFECTIVE WERE THE SANCTIONS? 
Previously, effectiveness was defined as the ability of sanctions to achieve their 
goals.  For O’Sullivan, the multilateral sanctions of the UN were the most effective.  She 
feels that they were the ones that achieved the narrowly stated goals of turning over the 
bombing suspects and ending support of terrorism.  Indeed, O’Sullivan has a valid point.  
After the end of the process which convicted the terrorist, Ali al-Megrahi, in 2002, the 
UN sanctions were officially dropped.  Libya fulfilled most of the compensatory 
obligations of the settlement and had previously renounced its support of terrorism.71  
O’Sullivan views the Reagan-era sanctions as a necessary precursor to multilateral 
sanctions.  Therefore, they too were moderately successful.  Her view of the ILSA is 
different however.  She sees the sanctions as the least effective.  O’Sullivan is not alone.  
One of the most widely accepted findings among those who study sanctions is that those 
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which are multilateral work better the unilateral ones.  O’Sullivan published her text 
before Libya’s December 2003 announcement, so her conclusions are based on a 
sanctions regime that still existed but had not achieved its goals.   
The effectiveness of Libyan sanctions can be viewed in a slightly different light.  
That is, all of the sanctions contributed directly to Libya’s decision to give up its WMD 
programs.  This opinion is based on two factors.  One is the cumulative impact of both 
the unilateral and multilateral sanctions.  The other is the nature of the Libyan oil 
industry.   
Twenty-five years ago, the sanctions initiated by the Reagan Administration 
began to change international perceptions about Libya and its leadership.  As both 
unilateral and multilateral sanctions mounted and Qadhafi became more and more 
isolated in the world, he began to question his choice of policy decision.  Obviously, the 
historical record shows that international terrorism was explicitly attacked.  However, 
Libya’s WMD policies suffered as well, even before the ILSA named abandonment of 
WMD as a stated goal.  O’Sullivan notes that the combined military embargoes of the 
unilateral and multilateral regimes severely hampered the Libyan’s ability to produce 
WMD.72  Arms imports that were not of the black market nature drastically fell over the 
lifespan of the sanctions.  Additionally, the isolation of Qadhafi put too much pressure on 
him both internally and externally.  Eventually, he had no choice but to address the 
demands of the U.S. and the international community.  These impacts explain his 
abandonment of international terrorism and in some part his desertion of WMD.  
Although some might argue that U.S. unilateral sanctions no longer could be effective 
after the UN sanctions were suspended and later dropped, Qadhafi still needed the 
support of the United States to fully re-integrate into the international playing field.  At a 
minimum, normal relations with the only superpower in the world should be seen as 
achieving substantial integration back into the mainstream world.  Qadhafi had to comply 
with the demands of the U.S. unilateral sanctions to complete his transformation to a 
legitimate player in world politics and economy. 
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The nature of the Libyan oil industry and the unilateral sanctions targeting them 
are also significant in Libya’s renouncement of WMD.   As was discussed previously, the 
Libyan oil industry both depended on and preferred American technology and expertise.  
Even with the dropping of multilateral sanctions, Qadhafi recognized that he could not 
build his economic and political power without the investment and expertise of U.S. 
firms.  Through the terms of the sanctions he was in large part compelled to give up 
WMD in order to receive much needed and valued American investment.   
In summary, both the unilateral and multilateral sanctions of the United States 
created the negative impact which eventually compelled Libya to give up its WMD.  The 
political isolation and the stagnation of the Libyan oil industry to which they contribute, 
manipulated Qadhafi’s cost-benefit analysis.  Only by eventually giving up WMD could 
he re-enter the international community and strengthen his country in a positive manner.  
It is interesting to note, however, that the changes in Libyan behavior did not occur in one 
fell swoop.  The punitive aspects of the sanctions alone did not force the Libyans to 
abandon WMD and terrorism thought they certainly contributed.  There were another 
dynamics at work.  One of them was coupling the sanctions with positive incentives.  
E.  ENGAGING LIBYA 
In the history of dealing with Libyan terrorism and proliferation, there exists a 
robust tit-for-tat dynamic where positive inducements encouraged the Libyans to steadily 
fulfill the goals established by the United States and the UN.  Haass and O’Sullivan 
conclude in Honey and Vinegar: Incentive, Sanctions and Foreign Policy, that, 
“incentives—or engagement strategies—can be applicable to managing relations not only 
with allies but also with adversaries.”73  Of the conclusions reached by Haass and 
O’Sullivan two important ones describe the Libyan situation.  First, these authors posit 
that, “The best potential candidates for conditional engagement are often countries in 
which decision-making is highly concentrated.”74  Decision-making in Libya is confined 
to Qadhafi and a few of his key advisors.  This made it easier for Western policy-makers 
to deal with one predominant and empowered interest group.  Second, Haass and 
O’Sullivan observe that, “Countries with acute economic and strategic vulnerabilities can 
 
73 Haass and O’Sullivan, Honey and Vinegar, 161. 
74 Ibid., 162. 
29 
                                                
make good engagement partners.”75  As has been discussed previously, Libya depends 
almost exclusively on its oil revenues for its economic well-being.  By focusing 
engagement on those incentives that would benefit the Libyan energy sector, the U.S. and 
the UN were able to bring about the desired changes in Libyan behavior.   
 The first incentive in the Western engagement strategy came when the United 
States and Britain offered to hold the Pan Am bombing trial in the Netherlands.  
Previously, U.S. and British officials had demanded that the trial be held in the United 
Kingdom.  Libya accepted the terms and from then on, developments in the Libyan case 
have involved mostly positive interaction.  In return for the suspension of painful UN 
sanctions, Libya handed over the bombing suspects.  After the conviction of al-Megrahi, 
Libya began to repay the families of the victims.  In return, the UN dropped the rest of 
the multilateral sanctions.  After President Bush promised the dropping of many of the 
years-old unilateral sanctions against Libya, the North African nation eventually gave up 
its WMD programs and submitted to comprehensive inspections.76  The positive 
incentives offered to Libya were dropping sanctions and extending invitations to 
membership in important beneficial organizations such as the World Trade Organization.  
The fact that the dropping of these sanctions could form the basis of the positive 
incentives offered to Libya speaks volumes about their effectiveness.  This engagement 
with respect to Libya’s renunciation of WMD is important.  Even after all of the 
multilateral sanctions of the UN were eliminated, the positive environment created in 
initial tit-for-tat exchanges set the stage for Libya to desert its pursuit of WMD.  The 
engagement of Libya it seems moved along progressively quicker as the two sides slowly 
built confidence in each other’s intentions. 
F. THE UTILITY OF SANCTIONS AND ENGAGEMENT 
Did the sanctions levied against Libya have any utility?  This chapter has already 
established that sanctions were effective in the Libyan case.  To measure their utility, it is 
necessary to briefly look at the costs involved.  Since utility is important to U.S. policy-
makers, one must examine the costs incurred by the United States.  The biggest losers in 
the Libyan situation were arguably the American oil companies.  However, the 
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suspension of their Libyan contracts did not drive them out of business.  It did not 
significantly impact the economy of the United States either.  The oil that flowed in from 
Saudi Arabia and the Middle East more than offset the loss of Libyan oil. American 
aircraft companies probably lost some deals, but the size of Libya compared to other 
countries made these losses rather small.  Since Libya purchased most of its conventional 
weapons and supplies from the Soviet Union, there was no great loss to American 
companies.  Additionally, and maybe most importantly, there was no great expenditure of 
American military resources. 
In retrospect, the utility of sanctions was quite good for the United States.  After 
2003, every goal, implicit or explicit, had been realized with the possible exception of 
regime change.  The accomplishment of these goals coupled with the relatively low cost 
incurred by the United States translates to high utility.  
G. SUMMARY 
In summary, the effectiveness of both unilateral and multilateral sanctions against 
Libya created an environment that was conducive to positive engagement in the end 
game.  Significant economic and political impact from the sanctions affected the cost-
benefit calculations of Qadhafi and his regime.   
Sanctions, both unilateral and multilateral, were effective because of a huge 
vulnerability in Libya, the oil sector.  Multilateral sanctions severely hurt this industry, 
but maybe not as much as the literature predicted it would.  Unilateral sanctions also were 
effective.  The Libyan oil industry was vulnerable to U.S. unilateral sanctions because of 
the Libyan dependence on U.S. technology and expertise. 
By engaging Libya at a time when sanctions had begun to affect the calculus of 
Qadhafi, the United States and its international allies were able to persuade a problem 
nation to significantly alter its strategic policies.  The chapter returns to the question 
posed in the beginning.  Were the costs of acquiring WMD too high for Libya? 
The answer is an unequivocal maybe.  Certainly, 25 years of sanctions took their 
toll on Qadhafi and the Libyan people.  Qadhafi occupied a unique place in the world as 
one of its most prominent red-headed stepchildren.  Internally, he felt pressure to 
maintain a certain standard for his people in order to stay in power.  These pressures were 
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great, and they did significantly influence his decision to give up WMD.  However, it 
would be premature to say that they were the sole reason for the Libyan renunciation.  
Analysis in the following chapters examines more possibilities for Libya’s decision.  In 


























III. WE KNOW WHAT YOU DID LAST SUMMER:  DID LIBYA 
BELIEVE THAT IT COULD NOT GET AWAY WITH WMD 
PROCUREMENT?  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The past year has been particularly trying for the U.S. intelligence community.  
Numerous inquiries and commissions have highlighted and condemned several crucial 
flaws and gaps in the way the United States collects and analyses its intelligence.  Most 
conversation in this area immediately turns to Iraq.  This type of scrutiny is necessary.  
However, there have been relatively few people who have highlighted potential 
intelligence success stories.  This chapter focuses on a very successful case of 
intelligence work.  The U.S. intelligence community carefully and fairly accurately 
tracked and catalogued Libyan exploits for the past 30 years.  This scrutiny had a two-
fold effect on Qadhafi’s regime.  First, it provided U.S. policy-makers with credible and 
tangible evidence with which they could formulate strategies to counter Libya’s 
undesirable moves.  Second, public release of this information showed the international 
community that, despite his rhetoric, Qadhafi engaged in unfavorable actions and foreign 
policy.  This served to further isolate him from the rest of world.  In this chapter, I 
document the intelligence work carried out by the United States with respect to Libya.  I 
identify intelligence work directly relating to WMD and show how this helped persuade 
both Libya and those who would formulate policy towards the North African pariah.  I 
also describe intelligence work relating to Libya’s state-sponsored terrorism.  This 
intelligence work was not directly related to WMD.  However, the policy that it inspired 
eventually had a significant effect on Libya’s cost-benefit analysis. 
This chapter finds that Western intelligence work had a significant effect on 
Libya’s decision to give up its WMD.  I reach a few important sub-conclusions which 
contribute to this finding.  First, the intelligence community formulated an accurate 
assessment of Libyan actions and programs.  Second, quality intelligence products moved 
other nations to join the United States in punishing Libyan terrorism and proliferation by 
consistently highlighting Qadhafi’s transgressions.  Finally, intelligence actions allowed 
the United States to be proactive in ultimately halting the Libyan nuclear program.  
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B. INTELLIGENCE AND LIBYAN CASE 
U.S. and Western intelligence agencies monitored Libya closely for the better part 
of three decades.  Understandably, intelligence agencies did not focus their attention 
solely on WMD.  During the 1980s, much of the analysis focused on Libya’s use of 
terrorism as a foreign policy instrument.  It would be easy to discount this work and 
concentrate on intelligence efforts against Libyan WMD.  However, the collection and 
analysis efforts targeting Libyan terrorism carried substantial weight in the policy 
decisions of not only the United States, but also the United Nations.  These policy 
decisions can be linked to both direct and indirect effects on Qadhafi’s WMD programs.  
It is therefore necessary to analyze intelligence efforts against both Libyan state-
sponsored terrorism and WMD.  It is convenient to look at these two categories and their 
associated implications separately.  The implications are then analyzed as a whole to 
show the significance of Western intelligence successes in the Libyan case.   
1. Western Intelligence and Libyan State-Sponsored Terrorism 
Throughout the 1980s the intelligence services of the United States and its allies 
linked Libyan-sponsored agents to various acts of terrorism around the globe. In this 
period of intelligence work, Western actions can be categorized as investigative in nature.  
In other words, they were not proactive.  There is little evidence to suggest that U.S.-led 
counter-terrorism efforts had much effect during this time period.  Western intelligence 
agencies responded to Libyan actions by linking its terrorists to the specific acts.  This in 
turn made Qadhafi and his regime culpable so that other punitive measure could be 
carried out.  I find it helpful to look at the intelligence work of the 1980s as three separate 
cases.  This is necessary because the policy that resulted from each investigation is 
somewhat unique for each case.  These three cases can be categorized as the early 1980s, 
the Berlin Discotheque Bombing, and the Pan-Am 103 and UTA 772 aircraft bombings. 
a. The Early 1980s 
Several Libyan-sponsored terrorist acts grabbed the attention of the 
Reagan administration in the beginning of the 1980s.  U.S. domestic agencies linked the 
Libyan Embassy in Washington, D.C. to several undesirable activities.  Among them 
were terrorism and the intimidation of Libyan dissidents residing in the United States.  
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This activity led the United States to close of the Libyan Embassy and expel the 
country’s diplomats.77
 In 1981, several more terrorist activities were linked by U.S. intelligence services 
to Qadhafi.  In October of that year, the U.S. Ambassador to Italy was recalled after 
intelligence sources discovered a plot to abduct or kill him.  The next month, shots were 
fired at the U.S. Ambassador to France.  In December, officials discovered explosives in 
speakers at an embassy-sponsored event in Sudan.  There were even press reports that 
Libya had sent hit-squads to assassinate then President Ronald Reagan.  In December 
1985, bombs in the Rome and Vienna airports killed five Americans.  U.S. intelligence 
agencies once again linked Qadhafi and Libyan-sponsored terrorist to the attacks.78   
 This wave of Libyan-sponsored terrorism elicited two important responses from 
the United States and the Reagan Administration.  First, in response to these actions, the 
United States levied major, comprehensive economic and diplomatic sanctions targeting 
the Libyan oil and airline industry.  Second, the United States began its decade-long 
freedom of navigation exercises in the Libyan-claimed Gulf of Sidra.  The implications, 
impact and significance of these sanctions and coercive diplomacy attempts is analyzed 
in other chapters.  The important thing to note here is that it was the intelligence 
community’s ability to implicate the Libyans in these acts that led to the subsequent 
punitive actions of the Reagan Administration.  In essence, intelligence collection and 
analysis resulted directly in measurable action against Qadhafi and his regime. 
b. The Berlin Discotheque Bombing 
On 5 April 1986, Palestinian terrorists blew up the La Belle nightclub in 
West Berlin.  This nightclub was known to be frequented by American service members 
serving in Germany.  The bomb killed two Army solders and injured 60 Americans in all.  
U.S. intelligence sources almost immediately implicated Libya in orchestrating the 
bombing.  U.S. agents were able to link the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin to the 
bombing through analysis of radio signals intercepted before and after the attack.79  U.S. 
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analysis was verified independently by an ex-STASI defector who confirmed that the 
Libyan Embassy provided logistical support to the operation.80
The bombing of the La Belle nightclub deeply angered President Reagan.  Within 
ten days of the terrorist attack, the United States launched it first and only military strike 
against Libya, targeting terrorist camps, airfields and command and control.  Operation 
EL DORADO CANYON was launched in retaliation for the Berlin attack.  As with the 
early 1980s intelligence work against Libya, the raid on Libya was a direct result of U.S. 
intelligence efforts.  By concretely linking Qadhafi to the bombing, Reagan could 
credibly defend his actions against the North African nation.  The effectiveness and 
implications of this raid are discussed in depth in Chapter IV. 
c. Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 Bombings 
In the final two years of the 1980s the two most lethal Libyan-sponsored 
terrorist attacks took place.  On 21 December 1988, a Pan Am flight from London, on its 
way to New York, exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland.  All 244 passengers and 15 crew 
members on board were killed.  Many of them were U.S. citizens.  On September 1989, a 
French Airliner, UTA 772, exploded over Niger as a result of a terrorist bomb.   
Immediately after the Pan Am 103 tragedy, intelligence and investigation 
agencies from the United States and several European countries launched a massive 
probe into tracking down those responsible for the bombing.  Steven Emerson described 
the investigation as: 
the most comprehensive and meticulous criminal investigation ever 
conducted.  Hundreds of investigators from both sides of the Atlantic 
spent the better part of three years tirelessly working the case – conducting 
nearly 20,000 interviews in more than 100 countries and tracking down 
nearly every potential lead, no matter how bizarre or difficult to chase.81   
Western intelligence initially linked the bombing to Syrian and Iranian cells 
acting in retaliation for the U.S. shoot down of an Iranian airliner.  As the investigation 
continued, it became clear that the Libyans were also involved.  In fact, at the end of the 
investigation, intelligence analysts labeled Libya as solely responsible for the act of 
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terrorism.  The damaging evidence included microchip detonators traced to two Libyan 
intelligence officers operating out of Malta and the confession of a Libyan operative in 
Congo.  Some individual analysts doubted whether the operation was only conducted by 
Libya, however, none of them ever expressed that the Libyans were not culpable.  The 
result of this massive effort was the indictment of two Libyan intelligence agents for 
masterminding the Pan Am 103 operation.82
The investigation into the bombing of UTA 772 was conducted mainly by the 
French.  Their analysis yielded the conviction in absentia of six Libyan agents.83  
However, U.S. agencies also quickly linked the Libyans to the bombing.  In a now 
declassified CIA report, analysts note, “His [Qadhafi’s] strategic goals – including ending 
French influence in Africa – and terrorist capabilities remain intact.  Qadhafi has 
sanctioned attacks against UTA airliners in the past, and some evidence suggests Tripoli 
was involved in the most recent attack.”84  In a matter of days, U.S. intelligence fingered 
the Libyans. 
The Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombing investigations are extremely important 
in the Libyan case for two reasons.  First, the investigations yielded credible defendants 
who could be prosecuted for these heinous acts.  Second, and more importantly, the work 
of Western intelligence agencies directly affected major policy decisions.  This time, the 
Libyan link to both bombings resulted in comprehensive, multilateral UN sanctions 
against the North African nation.  The significance and implications of these sanctions 
are discussed in detail in Chapter II.  Of importance here is the stellar work of Western 
intelligence that directly contributed to this major shift in international sentiment towards 
Qadhafi and Libya. 
d. Summary 
I noted previously that none of these intelligence successes directly 
contributed to Libya’s decision to give up its WMD programs.  However, they did 
contribute indirectly.   Intelligence work on Libyan state-sponsored terrorism led quickly 
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to major policy decisions from both the United States and the international community.  
These policy decisions included comprehensive unilateral and multilateral sanctions as 
well as U.S. coercive diplomacy.  I discuss the detailed impact on Libya of each policy 
tool in Chapters Two and Four, but the bottom-line is that there was influence on Libya’s 
WMD calculus.  Furthermore, the intelligence work of the 1980s showed Qadhafi that 
any of his attempts at problematic foreign policy would be closely monitored by the 
United States and its allies and that these entities would not allow him to proceed 
unchecked.  At the beginning of the 1990s, Qadhafi had mostly given-up on state-
sponsored terrorism and resorted to large-scale activities to hide his WMD proliferation 
efforts. 
2. Western Intelligence and Libyan WMD 
At the end of the 1980s, Qadhafi refocused his efforts from terrorism to WMD 
proliferation.  It is well documented that he began his quest for a nuclear weapon in the 
1970s.85  However, he began his proliferation exploits in earnest in the late 1980s.  Again, 
it was intelligence that discovered these programs, and it would ultimately be intelligence 
that began the process of Libya’s WMD disarmament.  U.S. intelligence agencies kept 
successive administrations informed of Qadhafi’s WMD developments throughout the 
1990s.  Several CIA reports catalogue his efforts and highlight them to decision-makers.86  
In the following paragraphs, I highlight the most effective use of intelligence assets in 
exposing and affecting Libyan WMD programs.  These cases adequately illustrate the 
importance and relevance of intelligence in the Libyan case, and allow me to draw 
broader findings on intelligence and Libyan WMD in the end of the chapter.  The 
following events are now discussed in further detail:  the Rabta and Tarhunah CW plants, 
Libyan ballistic missiles, and the resurgence of the Libyan nuclear weapons program. 
a. Rabta 
Rabta, the first major chemical weapons plant constructed by Libya, was 
discovered under construction in Libya.  At the time, William Webster, then director of 
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to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions January - June 1999, Unclassified 
Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
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the CIA, observed that it, “may be the single largest chemical warfare agent production 
plant in the Third World.”87  At the time Webster was giving testimony to Congress on 
the spread of chemical weapons.  In the months leading up the speech, U.S. intelligence 
agencies had discovered the construction of the factory and its connection with some 
prominent West German companies.  Their work established a link between the Libyan 
plant and European suppliers.  Intelligence also pieced together that thousands of foreign 
workers were employed in the construction of the plant, including West German workers.  
In 1990, Libya offered to destroy the plant if the Western nations helped it build a new 
pharmaceuticals plant, but the offer was rejected.88  U.S. policy-makers pressed the 
international community to put pressure on Libya using the Rabta intelligence.  In the 
conference leading to the Chemical Weapons Convention’s ban on chemical weapons, 
the United States tried in vain to convince other nations that Rabta was a serious threat to 
the world.  Soon after, the plant was seemingly destroyed by a fire.  However, U.S. 
satellites quickly revealed the fire as a hoax.89  Not much mention of the plant was made 
following the fire and intelligence on it was limited.  However, inspections in 2004 
revealed that the plant was still operational. 
On some levels, the intelligence surrounding Rabta seems to have been of little 
use.  The international community refused to see it as a threat and the plant continued to 
operate.  However, intelligence in the Rabta event was important for a few reasons.  First, 
it highlighted the large amount of foreign involvement in the Libyan chemical weapons 
program.  Some West German businessman would eventually be sentenced to prison for 
their role in the plant.90  This forced European nations to take a serious look at their 
export control programs with regards to Libya and other rogue nations.  Second, U.S. 
intelligence again showed Qadhafi that the United States knew what he was up to.  While 
Libya continued with WMD proliferation, it had to become much more secretive about it 
 
87 Quoted in, Colin Norman, “CIA Details Chemical Weapons Spread,” Science 243, no. 4893 (17 February 
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and also could not rely as heavily on European suppliers.  The bottom line is that 
intelligence collecting and analysis facilitated effective U.S. nonproliferation policy. 
b. Tarhunah 
Tarhunah was Libya’s second large-scale chemical weapons facility.  
Again, U.S. intelligence agencies uncovered the facility.  CIA analysts discovered the 
deeply buried complex using satellite photos and human intelligence in 1992.  From 1992 
to 1996 when the Clinton Administration openly threatened the facility, U.S. intelligence 
worked to hamper its progress.  Because the CIA had trouble penetrating Qadhafi’s inner 
circle, it relied on foreign informants who were crucial to the Libyan chemical program.  
Officials determined that there was no good way to destroy the plant, so they 
concentrated instead on hampering its progress.  CIA and State Department officials 
persuaded several European nations to stop sending spare parts to the facility.  A CIA 
team even met directly with then German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and persuaded him to 
stop German companies from sending boring equipment into Libya.91  In the end, the 
United States could only slow the facility’s construction.  Qadhafi found alternate 
methods for procuring the necessary equipment.   
The recently released Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction’s Report contains a chapter dealing with 
Libyan WMD and U.S. intelligence.  The commission was convened to examine the U.S. 
intelligence capabilities after serious problems arose from incorrect analyzing of Iraq’s 
WMD capabilities.  One of the findings of the report is that intelligence had only limited 
effectiveness against the Libyan chemical program due to technical collection methods.92  
While this may be true, intelligence efforts against Tarhunah were effective in other 
ways.  First, the intelligence community was highly successful in curtailing what 
remained of European firms’ support to Libyan programs.  Qadhafi was forced to turn to 
Asia, and in doing so, he needed to take more chances.  Second, just as with Rabta, Libya 
had to work even harder to hide its activities.  Third, uncovering Tarhunah and 
publicizing it brought ever greater international pressure on Qadhafi and his regime.  It 
served to further cut off the already isolated leader.  Fourth, the importance of foreign 
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expertise and technology to Libyan programs was again highlighted.  One other factor is 
interesting in the Tarhunah analysis.  It is interesting to note that CIA officials actually 
participated in diplomatic efforts of persuasion.  Previously, intelligence agencies solely 
gathered and provided information to policy-makers.  This role is further discussed in the 
nuclear program section.   
c. Libyan Missile Program 
The Libyans relied heavily on the North Koreans for their ballistic missile 
programs.  Throughout the 1990s, U.S. and Western intelligence agencies accurately 
analyzed and tracked Qadhafi’s ballistic missile program.  The WMD Reports observes, 
“The Community had intelligence on facility locations, personnel involved in the 
programs, and Libya’s cooperative efforts with other nations.”93  In essence, U.S. 
intelligence provided the necessary information for policy makers to make informed 
decisions when targeting the Libyan missile program. 
The intelligence on Libyan programs would become important when the United 
States confronted the Libyans with the information.  I discuss this matter late in the 
chapter. 
d. Libyan Nuclear Program 
As was noted earlier, Qadhafi desired a nuclear weapon beginning in the 
mid-1970s.  He was unable to make much progress with the program for several years.  
Qadhafi’s efforts ranged from offering to pay off the entire amount of India’s debt ($15 
billion) to trying to obtain small amounts of nuclear material on the black market.94  None 
of his numerous efforts yielded any tangible results.  However, with the suspension of 
UN sanctions in 1999, Qadhafi and Libya made substantial progress in developing a 
nuclear weapon.  Here, the value of U.S. intelligence work was extremely high. 
The exploits of the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, A.Q. Khan, have been 
well documented over the past year.  After featuring prominently in the creation of the 
Pakistani bomb, Khan turned his efforts to selling nuclear technology to other nations.  
Cataloguing the complete extent of Khan’s operation is beyond the scope of my analysis.  
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However, summarizing his interactions with the Libyan nuclear program is necessary to 
show the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence.   
In 1997, Khan accepted an offer for 100 million dollars to manufacture a 
complete bomb-building facility for the Libyans.  Due to U.S. pressure on Pakistan to 
curtail Khan’s suspected efforts, Libya would have to wait a couple of years while Khan 
set up new supply networks in South Africa and Malaysia.  This shift to new suppliers 
gave U.S. intelligence agencies an opportunity to initiate sophisticated monitoring on 
Khan’s network.  George Tenet, former CIA director, stated, “we [U.S. intelligence] were 
inside his residence, inside his facilities, inside his rooms."95  This golden break allowed 
U.S. intelligence agencies to monitor and gather information on Khan’s activities.  These 
agencies exercised caution not to move too quickly in order to prevent a, “compromise of 
a collection system costing millions of dollars or a specific, crucial source that would be 
evident if the information were acted on.”96  Continued tracking of Khan’s activities 
showed that he had set up a new operation in Malaysia.  U.S. and British agencies then 
determined in late 2002 that Khan’s extensive nuclear activities were intended for Libya.  
The British-authored Butler Commission Report stated that, “By January 2003, the JIC 
[Joint Intelligence Committee, U.K.] was becoming particularly concerned at the 
progress Libya might be able to make as a result of the assistance it had received from the 
network…Khan’s activities had now reached the point where it would be dangerous to 
allow them to go on.”97  When British intelligence received reliable information that a 
ship, BBC China, containing nuclear equipment was leaving Malaysia bound for Libya, 
U.S. and British agencies were able to track and ultimately interdict the shipment.  This 
interdiction marked the final blow to both the Libyan nuclear program and A.Q. Khan’s 
network.98
The impact of Western intelligence work on the Libyan nuclear program, 
especially in the last five years, cannot be understated.  Stellar work by U.S. and British 
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agencies accurately tracked and analyzed most of the important events in the case.  
Intelligence work led directly to the interdiction of crucial elements of the Libyan 
program.  Again, Western intelligence showed Qadhafi that his best efforts to conceal his 
intentions were not beyond the reach of the international community.  In fact, the final 
interdiction of Libyan-intended nuclear components may well have been the final blow to 
the Libyan WMD program.  This is discussed later in this chapter. 
e. Intelligence Limitations 
Western agencies performed well in the Libyan case, but they did not 
perform perfectly.  It is worth noting intelligence shortcomings before continuing.  In the 
1980s, Western intelligence agencies were very reactive with respect to Libya.  In many 
of the Libyan terrorist episodes, intelligence was able to piece together what happened 
but could do nothing to prevent these attacks.  It appears that intelligence agencies also 
had a hard time placing reliable sources inside the regime.99  Western intelligence adapted 
to this limitation by going after supply chains.  The Intelligence Capabilities Report also 
notes a few intelligence shortcomings in the Libyan case including overestimation of 
chemical stockpiles and uncertainty with respect to its biological programs.  Two of the 
shortcomings are worth further explanation.  First, analysts equated procurement with 
technical ability.  In previous chapters, I have pointed out that Libya lacked sufficient 
indigenous technological capability.  It had to rely on foreign expertise.  Had analysts 
realized this early on, then counter-proliferation intelligence work could have focused on 
foreign supply chains much earlier.  Second, analysts did not take into account the 
contributions of other influence strategies in play such as political and economic 
pressure.  Incorporating information from these strategies might have allowed 
intelligence agencies to more effectively concentrate their efforts on parts of the Libyan 
program that would produce the desired outcomes.100
 While intelligence agencies did not perform flawlessly, they did perform 
effectively.  Intelligence work on the Libyan case led to significant persuasive forces that 
manipulated Qadhafi’s cost-benefit analysis. 
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f. Summary 
Western intelligence work against Libya’s WMD programs contributed both 
directly and indirectly to thwarting Libya’s WMD efforts.  Indirectly, the successive 
exposure of nearly all of the Libyan WMD programs showed Qadhafi that the United 
States and its allies would not turn a blind eye to his proliferation exploits.  In fact, they 
showed him that the eye was always on him.  The repeated revelations on different 
Libyan WMD efforts also served to further isolate Qadhafi and his regime.  Western 
intelligence directly affected Libyan WMD programs by making possible the interdiction 
of key elements of the Libyan nuclear program.  Equipment and expertise which Qadhafi 
desperately needed were denied him by Western intelligence work. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE LIBYAN CASE 
I have shown above that the intelligence agencies of the United States and its 
allies were actively involved in the Libyan case for the past three decades.  Intelligence 
agencies collected, analyzed and acted on many of Qadhafi’s troubling behaviors.  These 
include state-sponsored terrorism and WMD.  In order to determine whether or not this 
work was significant, I show its effectiveness.  If intelligence was effective in the Libyan 
case, then it was also significant.  The effectiveness can be shown in three different areas.  
First, intelligence work provided decision-makers with justification to carry out different 
policy options that would ultimately influence Libyan WMD indirectly.  This work also 
focused negative attention on Qadhafi and his regime. I label this as support of other 
policies.  Second, intelligence work exposed major pieces of the Libyan WMD program.  
I label this as nonproliferation support.  Third, intelligence work actually hampered and 
sometimes halted Libyan WMD efforts.  I label this as counter-proliferation support. 
1.   Support of Other Policies 
Intelligence provided indirect effects WMD efforts even when it was not 
specifically focusing on it.  Analysis of intelligence agencies led to some important 
policy decisions.  In the 1980s, intelligence agency-led investigations justified strict 
unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Libya.  These sanctions were shown in the 
previous chapter to have been effective in influencing Qadhafi’s calculus. Therefore, the 
intelligence work the gave birth to them must was also effective.  The same is true to with 
U.S. coercive diplomacy actions in the 1980s such as the raid on Libya and U.S. freedom 
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of navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra.  These actions were moderately effective in 
influencing the Libyan WMD decision and thus, the intelligence work which justified 
them was, too.  
2. Nonproliferation Support 
Intelligence revealed to the world major portions of Qadhafi’s WMD programs.  
Western agencies linked Libya to terrorist bombings and actions, exposed its two major 
chemical weapons production facilities, and exposed its ambitious nuclear aspirations.  
This exposure had two results which can be called somewhat effective.  One result is that 
repeated revelations into Libyan programs forced to Qadhafi to become successively 
more secretive with his proliferation efforts.  The effect was that it was more difficult for 
him to breed successful programs.  The other result is that intelligence work focused 
negative attention on Qadhafi.  No Western nation, or it industries could afford to be 
associated with Libya.  Qadhafi had to turn to different suppliers and thus take more 
chances which were easier for U.S. intelligence and other agencies to exploit.  These 
actions were moderately effective because they exposed Qadhafi’s programs to the world. 
3.  Counter-proliferation Support 
Counter-proliferation support occurred in two different episodes in the Libyan 
case.  The first is Tarhunah.  Here, U.S. intelligence agencies were directly involved in a 
coherent effort to stop the construction of the chemical weapons facility.  While they did 
not succeed in halting the operation, they significantly delayed its completion.  It took the 
Libyans over five years to complete the facility when a much more rapid timeline would 
have been possible with unrestricted access to the necessary equipment. 
The exposure of the Libyan nuclear weapons program is the second important 
episode.  In this episode, U.S. and British intelligence agencies were instrumental in 
halting the development of a Libyan nuclear weapon.  They had penetrated the Khan 
network and learned the extent of Qadhafi’s nuclear ambitions.  Intelligence work then 
led to the interdiction of key elements of the Libyan program.  This interdiction was “the 
straw that broke the camel’s back”.   
In March of 2003, Qadhafi’s son approached British intelligence agents looking 
for a way to end the North African nation’s years of isolation.101  Over the next few 
months, U.S. and British agents relayed to the Libyans that they needed to divulge and 
give up their WMD efforts. These talks were going nowhere until the Libyan nuclear 
shipment was interdicted.  This interdiction as well as presenting to the Libyans a 
comprehensive picture of exactly what Western intelligence knew about its nuclear and 
missile programs finally convinced Qadhafi and his regime that they should abandon 
WMD and come back into the international community.  George Tenet has conveyed 
these ideas to a variety of audiences.  In a speech to Congress, he explained: 
Our intelligence convinced them to disclose several dozen facilities, 
including their deployed Scud B sites and their secret North Korean-
assisted Scud C production line.  [Additionally,] we arranged to have the 
cargo seized, showing the Libyans that we had penetrated their most 
sensitive procurement network.102   
Thus, counter-proliferation support was very effective in persuading Qadhafi to 
renounce his WMD.  
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4. Conclusion 
The combination of both the moderate effectiveness of other policy and 
nonproliferation support and the high effectiveness of counter-proliferation support leads 
me to conclude that intelligence was significant in persuading Libya to renounce its 
WMD programs (See Figure 3).  The Western intelligence community formulated an 
accurate assessment of Libyan actions and programs.  Quality intelligence products 
moved other nations to join the United States in punishing Libyan terrorism and 
proliferation by consistently highlighting Qadhafi’s transgressions.  Finally, intelligence 
actions allowed the United States to be proactive in ultimately halting the Libyan nuclear 
program.  Having established that intelligence was a significant causal factor in the 
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IV.  WE GOT SADDAM, YOU’RE NEXT:  DID THE THREAT OF 
U.S. MILITARY FORCE COMPEL LIBYA TO GIVE UP ITS WMD? 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to document the significance of coercive diplomacy in 
motivating Libya to give up its WMD.  The role of coercive diplomacy is certainly the 
most hotly contested of the causal factors.  Sanctions and the severing of diplomatic ties 
are in fact coercive measures. Their purpose is to compel the target nation to change its 
behavior.  However, they are not part of a strictly coercive diplomacy strategy.  Coercive 
diplomacy is, “the attempt to get a target--a state, a group (or groups) within a state, or a 
nonstate actor--to change its objectionable behavior through either the threat to use force 
or the actual use of limited force.”103  This chapter examines those elements of U.S. – 
Libyan relations which fit within the definition of coercive diplomacy.  I begin with a 
brief history of military related actions carried out against Libya by the United States.  
This includes both threatened and actual military options.  Next, I analyze the effects of 
American coercive actions on Libya’s calculus.  This analysis includes a study of Libyan 
counter-coercion efforts. I then relate this analysis to the guiding question of this chapter.  
Finally, I summarize the explanatory power of coercive diplomacy in influencing 
Qadhafi’s decision to abandon WMD and rank its significance. 
There is some credible evidence that Qadhafi and Libya were influenced by U.S. 
military threats and actions.  However, I find that the significance of coercive diplomacy 
in changing Qadhafi’s actions and forcing him to renounce WMD is rather minor.  At the 
most they may have added extra weight to the more poignant effects of sanctions and 
intelligence successes.  In the least, they may have instead signaled a lack of resolve on 
behalf of the Americans to follow through with their threats.  In any event, it is clear from 
the Libyan case that U.S. policy-makers should not rush headlong into threatening a 
rogue nation without carefully analyzing what factors make for success and what 
reactions these threats are likely to stir-up.   
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B. AMERICAN THREATS AND MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA 
Military-related interactions with Libya began almost immediately after the total 
deterioration of diplomatic relations.  Nearly every episode related to military actions or 
threats involved the use of American airpower, most of it carrier-based.  Early skirmishes 
with the Libyan Air Force related directly to Libya’s claim over the Gulf of Sidra, first 
made in 1973.  International law recognizes that the territorial waters of a nation extend 
12 miles off of its coasts.  However, a bay can also be counted as territorial water if 
certain conditions are met.  Since the Gulf of Sidra had an opening of over 300 miles, 
Libya’s claim was rejected by the United States in early 1974.104  Soon after, the President 
authorized a Freedom of Navigation exercise in the gulf in order to maintain its open 
status.  The presence of U.S. aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Sidra throughout the 1980s 
sparked several aerial engagements.   
In September of 1980, a Libyan fighter fired a missile at an American EC-135.  
The missile missed its target with no retribution attacks by the United States.   About one 
year later, in August of 1981, two Libyan SU-22s fired missiles at two Navy Tomcats 
that were escorting the Libyan planes out of a U.S. declared exercise area.  The F-14s 
evaded the missiles and then shot down the two Russian-built fighters.  In 1983, two F-
14s once again intercepted to Libyan fighter over the Gulf of Sidra, but no shots were 
exchanged.105
The year 1986 marked the highest level of military engagement between the 
United States and Libya.  Early in the year, Qadhafi proclaimed a “line of death” across 
the Gulf of Sidra.  He warned the any American craft entering the gulf would be shot 
down or sunk.  The Americans responded to Qadhafi’s bold proclamation by conducting 
a large exercise (Operation Prairie Fire) involving over 40 ships and 200 aircraft in the 
Mediterranean.  Soon after U.S. Navy aircraft and surface vessels crossed the “line of 
death” in late March, the Libyan fired several surface-to-air missiles (SAM) at the 
Americans.  The United States responded by destroying the SAM sites and bombing and 
sinking several small Libyan patrol boats that were harassing American naval vessels.106   
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Not surprisingly, the Libyan-sponsored bombing that killed two U.S. Army soldiers in a 
Berlin nightclub occurred only two weeks later.   
In response to this act of terrorism, President Reagan launched the biggest of all 
of the U.S. military actions against Libya, Operation EL DORADO CANYON.  On 15 
April 1986, over 100 USAF and USN aircraft carried out strikes on 5 different sets of 
targets within Libya.  Among them were Qadhafi’s command and control center, two 
military airfields, and two terrorist training camps.  While the raid did not specifically 
target Qadhafi, it was hoped that he would be somewhere near his command center.  The 
strikes achieved decent damage with 37 Libyans killed and minor collateral damage.  
Additionally, Qadhafi’s adopted daughter was killed in the raid.  The United Stated lost 
one F-111 and its crew of two.107   
The final aerial duel between Libya and the United States took place in 1989.  
Once again, two U.S. Navy F-14s shot down two Libyan Mig-23s over the Gulf of Sidra 
after the Libyan fighters pursued the American aircraft despite their execution of several 
evasive maneuvers.108  The above incidents catalogue the actual use of American force 
against Libya.  However, three additional attempts at coercive diplomacy also merit 
discussion. 
Sometime in 1988, U.S. intelligence agencies revealed to the world that Libya had 
constructed a chemical weapons production facility in Rabta with the help of private 
German companies.  Some linked the 1989 downing of the two MIGs to coercive efforts 
of the United States.  However, the generally accepted explanation is that the two events 
were unrelated from the standpoint of the United States.  The United States publicly 
chose to follow diplomatic and economic avenues to put pressure on Libya to stop 
weapons production at Rabta.  It met with considerable resistance from Europe, on 
whether Rabta was indeed a weapons plant, and also on whether a military course of 
action was prudent.  Most European nations felt that attacking Rabta would only provoke 
more terrorist attacks from Qadhafi.  Still, George Shultz, then U.S. Secretary of State, 
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hinted at military options by stating, “Obviously, if the facility [Rabta] were destroyed 
that would take care of the problem.  That’s always possible.”109
Once again in 1996, the United States overtly considered the idea of military 
options against Libya.  This time, Libya had constructed a new, underground chemical 
weapons facility in Tarhunah.  Then CIA Director, John Deutch, called Tarhunah, “the 
world’s largest chemical weapons plant.”110  U.S authorities released drawings of the 
plant to the public and then Secretary of Defense, William Perry, told the press that the 
United State would not allow Libya to finish construction of the plant.  He further added 
his statement could most definitely be taken as a warning that the U.S. was willing to 
bomb the facility.111  In an even bolder statement, Howard Smith, Perry’s nuclear 
weapons technical expert, in a public speech, said that the United States would have to 
use tactical nuclear weapons to destroy the deeply-buried and hardened facility.112
Finally, elements of coercive diplomacy against Libya can be extrapolated from 
President George W. Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy.  Section V of the strategy 
deals with nations and actors dabbling in WMD.  It states that emphasis has shifted from 
Cold War Deterrence to countering rogue states dealing in WMD.  On major feature of 
the policy is that the United States will now deal with proliferators in a proactive fashion.  
Among other things, this means that the United States is prepared to use pre-emptive 
military force against rogue nations.113  Although Libya is not named in the strategy, it is 
possible to infer that its WMD efforts fell under the auspice of the new strategy. 
C. METHODOLOY  
While each of the actions described above entails some threat or actual use of 
force against Libya, it is not easy to analyze the coercive effects of them individually.  
Rather, I present them based on how they fit into different coercive diplomacy strategies 
targeted at Libya for the last 20 years.  This serves two purposes.  First, placing these acts 
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into broad categories allows me to relate them to their broad objectives.  Second, and 
equally as important, it facilitates measuring the effects of coercive diplomacy on Libya’s 
renunciation.  Before this empirical assessment, it is helpful to examine exactly what kind 
of policy moves compose coercive diplomacy 
1. Elements of Coercive Diplomacy 
 Robert Art observes that coercive diplomacy is by nature a form of compellence.  
In essence, all forms of coercion compel the target to change its behavior.  Compellence 
can take three different forms in coercive diplomacy:  diplomatic threats, demonstrative 
use of force which can be exemplary or limited use of force, and full scale war.  Since 
coercive diplomacy aims to avoid war, only threats and demonstrative use of force are 
employed in this strategy.114  One common definition of war says that casualties must 
number over 1000.  Using this threshold, no event in the Libyan case comes close to war.  
Therefore, all of the following cases of coercive diplomacy against Libya involve either 
threats or demonstrative use of force. 
2. Coercive Diplomacy and Libya:  Defining Efforts and Objectives 
The individual aerial and naval engagements of the 1980s can be lumped into one 
category.  While each was a separate act of force often spread out by years, they relate to 
one theme.  All of these episodes concerned the Gulf of Sidra and the right to free 
passage.  Each encounter with Libyan forces occurred over or on the gulf.  In these 
engagements, the goal of U.S. coercive diplomacy was to persuade Libya to give up its 
false claim to the Gulf of Sidra.  By placing its forces consistently within the “line of 
death” the very overt threat of the U.S. military presence and the limited aerial 
engagements were meant to compel Libya to give up its claim.  Certainly, another goal of 
these acts was to keep pressure on Libya for its support of terrorism.  Alexander George 
writes, “they were intended to demonstrate, to both Qadhafi and Europeans, that the 
United States was losing patience with state-sponsored terrorism and was prepared to 
take forceful action, if necessary,”115
One episode of coercive diplomacy occurring in the 1980s that must be separated 
from the rest of that time period is Operation EL DORADO CANYON.  I do this for two 
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reasons.  First, this was a full scale raid initiated by the United States.  Second, it had 
some different objectives than the Gulf of Sidra skirmishes.  President Reagan’s goals for 
the raid were twofold.  First, he wanted to punish Qadhafi and his cohorts for the Berlin 
bombing and other acts of terrorism.  Second, Reagan wished to persuade him to end his 
support of terrorism.  The President stated immediately following the raid that the 
“purpose of the bombing raids was to deter future attacks, not just to retaliate for those 
that already have taken place.”116
U.S. reactions to the discovery of the Rabta chemical plant are important because 
it was the first time that Libyan WMD entered the playing field.  Only the weakest of 
coercive threats were made during this time period.  There were the comments Schultz 
made and those of Reagan, who initially made a statement saying the United States was 
considering all options.  However, Reagan said a few weeks later that there existed no 
plan for bombing Rabta.117  Obviously, the primary objective of any form of U.S. policy 
was to compel the Libyans to abandon the project.  The evidence that coercive diplomacy 
was used is fairly scarce since all hints at military options towards Libya vanished almost 
immediately from U.S. rhetoric.  Interestingly enough, the Rabta facility burnt down 
about a year later.  Once this happened, U.S. policy-makers seemed to relax their stance 
towards Libya considerably even though U.S. reconnaissance satellites produced strong 
evidence that the fire was a hoax.  Most in the administration seemed to think that the 
plant would, “remain static as long as the heat’s on.”118  The “heat” referred to diplomatic 
and economic pressure. 
In sharp contrast to U.S. reactions towards Rabta, those towards the news of 
Tarhunah were quite firm.  As was noted above, several high-level policy-makers had no 
qualms about openly threatening Qadhafi and Libya if they did not cease work on the 
new plant.  Specific statements about bombing and tactical nuclear weapons definitely 
fell into the realm of coercive diplomacy.   The objectives of U.S. coercive threats in this 
situation were equally as clear:  “Shut down the plant or we’ll do it for you”. 
 
116 Norman Kempster, “Reagan Calls Raid a Victory, Expects Struggle to Continue,” Los Angeles Times, 
16 April 1986, 1. 
117 Unknown, “No Bombing Plan, Reagan Says,” Los Angeles Times, 17 January 1989. 
118 George Lardner Jr., “Satellite Photos Indicate Hoax at Rabta,” Washington Post, 7 April 1990, 11. 
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Finally, we can examine statements made in the National Security Strategy 
pertaining to rogue states and see if they contain elements of coercive diplomacy 
designed to persuade Libya.  The goal of this strategy is “to forestall or prevent such 
hostile acts [use of WMD] by our adversaries.  To accomplish this, the United States will, 
if necessary, act preemptively.”119
In summary, five potential uses of coercive diplomacy exist in U.S.-Libyan 
relations:  1980s policy in the Gulf of Sidra, Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the 
Rabta crisis, the Tarhunah crisis, and George W. Bush’s preemptive strategy versus 
proliferators.  Each of these cases is now further analyzed using the findings of George, 
Art and Cronin as metrics for their success or failure.   
In his pioneering work on the subject, George identified eight factors which could 
positively influence the outcome of a coercive diplomacy strategy.  They are the clarity 
of objectives, strong motivation of coercer to accept the costs and risk associated with the 
action, sufficient domestic and/or coalition support, strong coercer leadership, clear 
understanding of the desired end-state, target’s perception of the coercer’s sense of 
urgency, the target’s fear of unacceptable escalation, and motivation that favors the 
coercer. George proposes that strategies which contain most or all of these elements tend 
to have the best chance of succeeding.120
 George also notes that coercive diplomacy strategies can take on three different 
forms:  The ultimatum (deadline with credible threat of severe punishment), the gradual 
turning of the screw (lower sense of urgency with incremental punishment, and the try-
and-see (lacks urgency and credibility of severe retaliation).  The ultimatum is the most 
desirable but may not always be available to the coercer. 121   
Art and Cronin further examine the work begun by George and arrive at several 
important conclusions.  Among the most important with regards to Libya are the 
following.  First, superior capability does not guarantee success.  While capability 
matters, will, or credibility, is more important.  Second, demonstrative denial of the 
target’s goals works better than threats or actions designed to punish it.  Finally, a nation 
 
119 Bush, National Security Strategy, 15. 
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121 Alexander George in, Art and Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, viii. 
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should only resort to coercive diplomacy if it is willing to go to war or have a suitable 
backup plan if war is unacceptable.122   
D. COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST LIBYA 
The following subsections analyze the effects of the different U.S. coercive 
diplomacy attempts in detail.   The cumulative effects are then summarized. 
1. Gulf of Sidra Policy in the 1980s 
Was the coercive diplomacy successfully employed during the 1980s in the Gulf 
of Sidra?  I argue that is was with some important caveats.  I explained previously that 
the objectives of this period of coercive diplomacy were to both ensure that the Libyans 
could not claim the gulf as their own and continue pressure for Qadhafi to end his support 
of terrorism.  Although it took about nine years, there were no more challenges to the 
American claims of Freedom of Navigation after 1989.  Essentially, the Libyans lost 
every time they challenged American forces in the region.  In this case, the United States 
possessed both the superior capability and the stronger will -- elements labeled as crucial 
by Art and Cronin.  Additionally, the United States repeatedly demonstrated its 
willingness to deny the Libyans sole possession of the Gulf of Sidra.  The shoot-downs of 
several Libyan fighters were reactive and not punitive in nature. 
 The objective of keeping pressure on Qadhafi for his support of terrorism is more 
difficult to qualify as a success or failure.  Certainly, Qadhafi realized that American 
presence inside the “line of death” was more than just an exercise in enforcing the law of 
the sea.  However, there was a distinct lack of threats from the United States directed 
towards the terrorist camps and training facilities.  Also, there is no credible evidence that 
U.S. presence in the gulf persuaded Qadhafi to change his sponsoring of terrorists.  In 
fact, Libyan-sponsored terrorist acts continued throughout the 1980s.  At the most, this 
round of coercive diplomacy served to constantly remind Qadhafi that the United States 
was watching him and growing more and more distasteful of his foreign policy. 
2. Operation EL DORADO CANYON 
  Did Operation EL DORADO CANYON fulfill its objectives as a case of 
coercive diplomacy?  Again, I am hesitant to say that this operation fulfilled its 
objectives.  One objective was to punish Libya for the Berlin disco bombing.  The other 
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was to persuade Qadhafi to end his support of terrorism.  Certainly, this demonstrative 
raid was successful in inflicting limited punishment on Qadhafi.  If the Reagan 
Administration’s primary measure of success was bloodying the nose of Qadhafi, then 
the raid was an unqualified success.  However, what did it do to persuade Libya to end 
terrorist sponsorship?   
 As a form of demonstrative denial, the evidence suggests that the success of the 
raid was rather limited.  Although American airpower managed to damage two terrorist 
facilities, we know all too well today that terrorist organizations are extremely 
decentralized and amorphous.  It would have been next to impossible to demonstrate the 
ability to find and adequately destroy Qadhafi’s terrorist network.  Qadhafi had to have 
known this and although bloodied, he continued to support terrorism as an instrument of 
foreign policy.  The attacks on the airfields and command and control site did little to 
show the dictator that the United States could deny him his policy tool of choice.  George 
notes that State Department figures showed a decrease in the amount of Libyan-
sponsored terrorist activity following the attack.  He also notes, however, that Qadhafi 
made a much greater effort to hide his activities.123  Additionally, European nations had 
begun to tighten security measures which may have decreased the amount of terrorist 
attacks.   
 Thus, it seems that the raid on Libya delivered limited punishment to Qadhafi’s 
regime.  It was, however, much less effective in ending his support of terrorism.  This 
case of try-and-see coercive diplomacy did not deliver as was desired.  In fact, two of 
Libya’s worst terrorist attacks, Pan Am and UTA, followed the operation.  Additionally, 
the United States experienced many unforeseen negative consequences from the raid.  
Several European allies were openly critical of the U.S. attack, and most Arab nations 
strengthened their ties with Qadhafi to show Arab solidarity.   
3. The Rabta Crisis 
 To categorize U.S. policy reaction to the Rabta discovery as a case of coercive 
diplomacy is a huge stretch.  However, I feel it merits discussion as this is the first time 
that Libya was openly connected to WMD.  Almost immediately after the discovery 
became public, the very limited talk about taking out the facility disappeared.  There are a 
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couple of explanations for this.  Reagan was a lame-duck President waiting for George 
Bush to take over the presidency.  He may have left the problem to Bush in order to give 
him the chance to formulate his own policy.  Also, for many months, European nations 
denied the accusation, which complicated any military plans the United States may have 
been considering.  Additionally, the United States was to take part in chemical weapons 
negotiations in Geneva and may have been waiting to see how these concluded before 
moving ahead with any plans involving Rabta.124  However, a major U.S. naval 
deployment to the Mediterranean was announced soon after the Rabta plant was made 
public.  This lead to some speculation that the U.S. was preparing to attack Libya even 
thought the Pentagon called the deployment “routine”.125  In all likelihood, the mission 
was routine, but it created a condition that added credibility to initial U.S. threats. 
 Art and Cronin cite counter-coercion as one of the factors which make successful 
coercive diplomacy extremely difficult.  They note, “If the target believes that it can foil 
or significantly mitigate the coercer’s measures or in turn impose risks on the coercer, 
through…‘counter-coercion’ techniques, which can be political, economic, or military in 
nature, then the target is much less likely to give way.”126  Qadhafi’s staged fire at Rabta 
qualifies as one of these techniques.  Even though U.S. intelligence revealed the hoax, 
Qadhafi had introduced reasonable doubt and risk into the minds of American policy-
makers.   However, Libya’s hoax can be interpreted in an additional manner. 
 In this episode, there was only cursory, threatened use of force.  However, these 
threats came from an Administration that had shown willingness to use force against 
Libya throughout the 1980s.  Qadhafi’s deception at Rabta was intended to make the 
West think that his WMD capabilities had been destroyed.  He was worried about 
Western pressures which included these initial threats.  Thus, there were most likely 
some very minor benefits from these initial threats.  At that time, the United States had 
shown the will to bomb Libya.  The relatively unprotected nature of the facility also 
meant that it had the capability.  Essentially, U.S. threats acted as a mild deterrent that 
forced Qadhafi to be much more subtle in his proliferation efforts. 
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4. The Tarhunah Crisis 
If the Rabta event can be classified as an example of try-and-see coercive 
diplomacy, then the U.S. reaction to the Tarhunah discovery may well have invented a 
new category, knee-jerk coercive diplomacy.  Open threats ranging from conventional 
destruction of the facility to tactical nuclear weapons flowed freely from the mouths of 
senior policy-makers.  What may have started as a legitimate attempt at coercive 
diplomacy turned into a policy disaster for the Clinton Administration during the 
Tarhunah event.  Contingency planning against the Tarhunah complex unfolded as the 
United States actively considered joining the African Nuclear Free Weapons Zone Treaty 
where it would be obligated never to threaten the use of nuclear weapons on African 
soil.127  The remarks of Howard Smith opened a can of worms that senior policymakers 
were not prepared to deal with.  As suddenly and forcefully as the public threats against 
Tarhunah surfaced, they consequently disappeared.  Most likely, the public debate of the 
nuclear weapons issue was a major reason for a hasty retreat from overt U.S. threats.  
Additionally, open debate also occurred with reference to the ability of U.S. weapons to 
destroy the complex.128  It appears that the United States was severely hampered by both 
capability and credibility issues.  Also, there seemed to be a lack of strong leadership 
among senior policy-makers.  No one was able to control the remarks of different 
officials involved in the planning.  Thus, the situation turned negative in a very short 
time.   
 Fortunately for the United States, it had an acceptable escape route: diplomacy 
and sanctions.  It is interesting to note that only a few months later, Libya was added to 
the ILSA, Congressional legislation intended originally for Iran.  Policymakers included 
Libya’s renunciation of WMD as a necessary condition to have sanctions dropped.  
Tarhunah can be characterized as an ineffective case of coercive diplomacy.  The United 
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5. President Bush’s National Security Strategy and the Iraq Factor 
 What effect did the National Security Strategy of 2002 and the Iraq War have on 
persuading Libya to give up its WMD?  This is a difficult question to answer since the 
general statements contained in the document apply universally to any nation that pursues 
WMD.  Only Iran, North Korea and Iraq are mentioned by name.  I think it is safe to say 
that most nations pursuing WMD at the time of the announcement took notice of a shift 
in American military policy from reactive to preemptive.  However, it is nearly 
impossible to find any public statements from the Bush Administration specifically 
mentioning Libya.  Even in Bush’s famous “Axis of Evil” section of his State of the 
Union address, Libya is conspicuously absent.129  In this period, Libya was actively 
making good on its requirements mandated by UN sanctions.  Martin Indyk, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near East Affairs during the Clinton Administration, maintains that 
the Libyans were seeking to renounce WMD as early as 1999.130  This certainly seems 
plausible given the lack of Libya as the target of any specific Bush Administration policy.   
 Many senior policymakers, including President Bush, have stated publicly that 
OIF was a major reason why Qadhafi renounced his WMD efforts.  They argue that 
Qadhafi saw U.S. threats and war preparations against Saddam Hussein and realized that 
he might be next.  Rather than face a major U.S. attack, he decided to give up on 
proliferation.  At face value, this is a compelling argument.  In addition to the preemptive 
strategy announced in the National Security Strategy, The National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction clearly shows the will of the United States to actively 
combat proliferation.  It states, “WMD - nuclear, biological, and chemical - in the 
possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges 
facing the United States.”131  The message is that proliferation will not be tolerated.  It 
was these new strategies that paved the way to a second war with Iraq. 
 While the blanket threats to proliferators laid out in these documents are very 
clear, the argument that OIF significantly persuaded Qadhafi is shaky at best for several 
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reasons.  First, Libya approached British agents on the eve of the Iraqi invasion.  Qadhafi 
and his regime would have no forewarning of this attack for obvious security-related 
reasons.  The timing was purely coincidental.  Second, there is considerable evidence that 
the United States was actively involved in negotiations with Libya well before the Iraqi 
invasion.  In his “Beyond the Axis of Evil” speech, John Bolton observed, “Although 
Libya is one of seven countries on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terror, 
the U.S. has noted recent positive steps by the Libyan government that we hope indicate 
that Tripoli wishes to rejoin the community of civilized states.”132  The press also reported 
that the Bush Administration was considering Libyan overtures to give up WMD 
programs in exchange for suspension of the U.S. oil embargo.  An U.S. official noted, 
“There is clearly a light at the end of the tunnel if he [Qadhafi] plays his cards right.”133  
Additionally, Libya had been passing intelligence to Western officials since the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001.134  This evidence supports a strategy of U.S. engagement 
of Libya rather than one of coercive diplomacy. 
 The preemptive strategies of the Bush Administration and the Iraq example did 
not force Libya to renounce its WMD.  However, they did send a clear message to 
Qadhafi that proliferation would no longer be tolerated.  The general statements made in 
the document and in Bush’s speeches about rogue nations had a small effect on Libya.  
With all of the other arms of American power working to isolate the North African 
nation, Bush’s new preemptive policy was just another reminder that Libya needed to 
clean up its act before it could enjoy the benefits of renewed membership in the 
international community.   
6.   Coercive Diplomacy and its Libyan Success Rate 
 The previous discussion highlighted five instances where coercive diplomacy may 
have played a role in persuading Libya to change its behavior.  Throughout the 1980s, 
these attempts were aimed at stopping Libyan state-sponsored terrorism.  I categorize 
these attempts as marginally successful.  In the early and mid-1990s, coercive diplomacy 
attempts targeted Libya’s WMD capabilities.  The Rabta episode persuaded Qadhafi to 
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both hide and better protect his proliferation efforts.  In contrast, the events surrounding 
Tarhunah showed Qadhafi that his counter-coercion techniques had been somewhat 
successful.  When viewed together, coercive diplomacy attempts against the two plants 
were ineffective.  The unfortunate series of events at Tarhunah negated the slight 
persuasion evident in the Rabta situation.  Finally, the policies of the current 
administration were successful in showing U.S. resolve to rid the world of WMD.  They 
had minor effects on the Libyan calculus.   
D. WERE YOU REALLY SCARED MUAMMAR? 
 Of the five cases discussed above, only three of them relate directly to WMD.  It 
would be easy to discard the coercive diplomacy cases of the 1980s because their 
objectives targeted Libyan state-sponsored terrorism.  However, just as unilateral and 
multilateral sanctions cannot be separated; neither can these early coercive diplomacy 
attempts be separated from the later ones.  The reason is simple.  Any previous coercive 
diplomacy successes or failures from the past factor in to Qadhafi’s calculus.  The 1980s 
showed that the United States was serious about correcting Libya’s misguided and 
harmful foreign policy exploits.  Coercive diplomacy attempts in the 1990s were not 
persuasive.  Initially, U.S. threats forced Qadhafi to hide his proliferation thereby making 
it more difficult.  However, he also learned that hiding and protecting his WMD program 
could effectively counter U.S. coercive diplomacy attempts.  The policies of the current 
administration represented a major shift towards a more general coercive diplomacy 
strategy, but they did not specifically address Libyan WMD.  This lack of specificity 
made it more difficult to effectively manipulate Libya’s calculus.  Furthermore, the 
conditions necessary for effective coercive diplomacy did not exist in the three years 
leading up to Libya’s decision.  U.S. engagement of Libya during this time period 
overshadows coercive diplomacy.  
 I conclude that coercive diplomacy was not a significant contributor to Libya’s 
renunciation of WMD.  Instead, it merely served to reinforce the U.S. insistence that 
Libya amend its foreign policy to “play nice” with the rest of the world.  Additionally, the 
Libyan case study should serve as a healthy reminder to policy-makers that coercive 
diplomacy is not a strategy to be employed haphazardly.  Of all of the policy options 
available to the United States, it is the one that however attractive, will cost more than all 
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the others if misapplied.  This cost is not measured in dollars or man-hours, but in the 
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V.  CONCLUSION:  FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FROM 
THE LIBYAN CASE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis began with one, simple question:  Why did Libya give up its weapons 
of mass destruction?  As has been shown, the answer to this question is not so simple.  
Chapter I exposed the controversy concerning Libya’s WMD calculus.  Different groups 
and individuals involved in policy-making claim to know why Qadhafi felt compelled to 
give up his numerous proliferation attempts.  Sanctions, intelligence and the threat of 
military force make up the three most popular and probable choices.  Some advocate that 
decades of comprehensive unilateral and multilateral sanctions battered the Libyan 
economy by seriously hampering its oil revenue.   Others maintain that continuous 
monitoring and intervention by Western intelligence agencies showed Qadhafi that he 
could not hide his proliferation attempts.  Still others contend that U.S. military action 
and threats toward Libya and rogue nations, in general, showed that the United States 
would not tolerate proliferation and, if warranted, would take appropriate action.  In 
realty, it is nearly impossible to say that only one of these policy instruments can be said 
to have force Libya’s hand.  The combined use of these instruments, as well as internal 
dynamics, certainly factored into the North African nation’s calculus.  However, it is 
possible to show that some of these policy tools were more effective than the others.  In 
other words, some measures employed against Libya were significant and some were not. 
This work finds that sanctions, positive inducements and first-class intelligence 
work were significant in the Libyan case.   U.S. coercive diplomacy attempts, although 
somewhat persuasive, were not significant.  Additionally, the lessons of the Libyan case 
can be used in broader policy decisions targeting other proliferators.  Furthermore, a 
study of Libya’s renunciation yields theoretical implications as well, particularly in the 




B. IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF VARIOUS INFLUENCE 
STRATEGIES 
The following table graphically represents the success of the three major policy 
tools targeted at Libya. (Figure 3)  For explanation purposes, each tool is divided into the 
three time periods:  the 1980s, the 1990s, and 2000-2003.  In this manner, I can better 
define their impact at a snapshot in time, as well as show their cumulative effects.  These 
periods are fully explained in the following subsections.  
 
Figure 4.   Effectiveness of Influence Strategies 
 
1. Sanctions and Diplomacy 
Throughout the three decades of U.S. problems with Libya and Qadhafi, the use 
of sanctions was prevalent.  They began in the early 1980s and have only been lifted in 
the very recent past.  The sanctions levied against Libya started small and progressively 
grew to become some of the most comprehensive and longest-lasting in recent history.  
They included both unilateral and multilateral regimes, and their significance is discussed 
below. 
a. The 1980s 
This decade marked the beginning of sanctions against Qadhafi and his 
regime The Reagan-era unilateral sanctions of the 1980s started out gradually and soon 
escalated to a complete embargo.  These sanctions had three explicit goals:  punishing 
Libya for sponsoring terrorism, building support for multilateral sanctions, and building 
credibility for a military option in the event that sanctions failed to change Libyan 
behavior.  Implicitly, sanctions were intended to facilitate regime change.  The impact of 
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this period of sanctions was both economic and political.  These sanctions had an 
intangible economic effect.  The majority of Libyan oil fields and production facilities 
were originally built by American companies.  As has been noted previously, Libyan oil 
production in the 1980s barely kept pace with OPEC quotas.  These early sanctions did 
not hobble the Libyan economy as was hoped.  However, the majority of the Libyan 
infrastructure remained dependent on U.S. technologies and expertise to remain 
functioning.  Libyan oil fields were essentially frozen in the oil science of the late 1970s, 
while other oil producing nations benefited from newer technologies as they became 
available.  Therefore, the sanctions of the 1980s are labeled as slightly effective.  They 
did not achieve their lofty goals during the decade.  However, they initiated the 
degradation of the Libyan oil industry on which the country’s economy depends. 
b. The 1990s 
After Western authorities established the link between Libya and the 
perpetrators of the Pan Am and UTA bombings, multilateral sanctions soon followed.  
These sanctions aimed to force Libyan cooperation in the terrorist criminal trials and 
compel Qadhafi’s regime to end its support of international terrorism.  These sanctions 
impacted Libya in three ways.  First, they hampered the Libyan oil industry with even 
greater success than the unilateral sanctions of the 1980s.  The lack of increasing oil 
revenue worsened the Libyan economy which gave rise to internal pressures on Qadhafi 
and his regime.  It became increasingly difficult for the Libyan government to quell 
discontent by throwing money at it.  Second, UN multilateral sanctions politically 
isolated Qadhafi from the rest of the world.  Qadhafi’s attempts to become a transnational 
leader among Arab states and later North African states failed.  None of these regional 
players could afford to be seen as cooperating with Libya.  To do so would have meant 
the loss of their international prestige. Third, the multilateral ban on weapons-related 
technology transfers to Libya slowed and hampered Libyan efforts to procure WMD.  
The multilateral sanctions of the 1990s were the most successful and are labeled highly 
effective.  At the end of the decade, Libya had surrendered the Pan Am suspects, 
compensated the families of the victims, and virtually disappeared as a major state-





The last period of unilateral sanctions levied against Libya came in the 
ILSA and its 2001 extension.  The ILSA sanctions are important because they are the 
only ones that mandated Libyan WMD renunciation.  Although the ILSA came about in 
1996, it is after 1999 when it can be recognized as impacting Libya.  After UN sanctions 
were suspended in 1999, only U.S. sanctions remained in place. Some discount the ILSA 
sanctions because of big improvements in the Libyan economy after 1999.  However, 
these improvements coincided with a jump in world oil prices.  Libyan oil capacity 
remained severely degraded due to a lack of U.S. oil technology and expertise.  When 
President Bush lifted most of these sanctions early this year, the Libyans immediately 
awarded upgrade and exploration contracts almost exclusively to U.S. companies.  
After 1999, unilateral sanctions were aided by a new round of U.S. diplomacy 
with Libya.  Qadhafi was offered a reinstatement in the international community and 
much needed U.S. investment in return for giving up on proliferation.  The prospect of 
greatly increasing oil revenues and strengthening the Libyan economy certainly appealed 
to Qadhafi.   The final round of U.S. sanctions and the positive inducements which 
accompanied it are labeled moderately effective.  They alone could not persuade Qadhafi 
to give up his WMD.  Yet, they were extremely effective in driving up the relative costs 
of his proliferation efforts.   
d. Finding 1:  Sanctions and diplomacy were significant in Libya’s 
WMD renunciation 
Twenty five years of comprehensive unilateral and multilateral sanctions 
severely hampered the Libyan economy.  Although the demand to give up WMD was not 
specified in sanctions until 1996, it is impossible to separate those targeting terrorism and 
those which included WMD.  Each round of sanctions progressively hurt the Libyan 
economy more and more.  Once UN sanctions were suspended in 1999, the economy and 
oil infrastructure were in such a state of disrepair, that the remaining unilateral sanctions 
carried considerable weight.  U.S. engagement of Libya took advantage of the 
punishment of sanctions and offered Qadhafi a return to the international community and 
a way to reinforce his authoritative grip on his country.   
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2. Intelligence 
The United States and its allies used intelligence extensively in their efforts to 
curb wayward Libyan foreign policy.  Intelligence work ranged from collection and 
analysis of Libyan terrorism to active counter-proliferation efforts.  The effect and 
significance of this work is summarized below. 
a. The 1980s 
The intelligence work of the 1980s focused exclusively on Libyan-
sponsored terrorism.  While none of these intelligence successes directly contributed to 
Libya’s decision to give up its WMD programs, they did contribute indirectly.   
Intelligence work on Libyan state-sponsored terrorism led quickly to major policy 
decisions from both the United States and the international community.  These policy 
decisions included comprehensive unilateral and multilateral sanctions as well as U.S. 
coercive diplomacy efforts. The policy spawned by this intelligence work did influence 
Libya’s WMD calculus.  It did so by driving policymakers to craft sanctions and 
diplomatic efforts that eventually effected Qadhafi’s cost-benefit analysis.  Furthermore, 
the intelligence work of the 1980s showed Qadhafi that any of his attempts at problematic 
foreign policy would be closely monitored by the United States and its allies and that 
these entities would not allow him to proceed unchecked.  For these reasons intelligence 
in the 1980s was slightly effective.  Although it did not directly address Libyan WMD, it 
inspired WMD-related policy and influenced later decisions of the Libyan regime. 
b. The 1990s 
In the 1990s, U.S. intelligence work concentrated on Libyan WMD 
programs.  This decade marks a shift from non-proliferation efforts to counter-
proliferation efforts.  In other words, intelligence agencies transitioned from collecting 
and analyzing Libyan WMD efforts to actively trying to stop or hamper them.  On the 
non-proliferation side, intelligence revealed to the world some of the major portions of 
Qadhafi’s WMD programs.  Western agencies exposed its two major chemical weapons 
production facilities while they were under construction.  This exposure had two results 
which can be called somewhat effective.  One result is that repeated revelations into 
Libyan programs forced to Qadhafi to become successively more secretive with his 
proliferation efforts.  The effect was that it was more difficult for him to breed successful 
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programs.  The other result is that intelligence work focused negative attention on 
Qadhafi.  No Western nation, or it industries, could afford to be associated with Libya.  
Qadhafi had to turn to different suppliers and thus take more chances which were easier 
for U.S. intelligence and other agencies to exploit.   
U.S. intelligence counter-proliferation efforts began with Tarhunah.  Here, U.S. 
intelligence agencies were directly involved in a coherent effort to stop the construction 
of the chemical weapons facility.  While they did not succeed in halting the operation, 
they significantly delayed its completion.  It took the Libyans over five years to complete 
the facility when a much more rapid timeline would have been possible with unrestricted 
access to the necessary equipment. 
Thus, the effectiveness of U.S. and Western intelligence work in the 1990s is 
labeled as moderately effective.  It did not stop Qadhafi’s pursuit of WMD, but it most 
certainly obstructed it.  Qadhafi would turn to more secretive and daring methods in order 
to continue his proliferation efforts.  These methods could then be exploited. 
c. 2000-2003 
From 2000 to 2003 Western intelligence agencies played a vital role in 
persuading Libya to renounce WMD.  The counter-proliferation efforts of these agencies 
directly led to the exposure of the Libyan nuclear weapons program.  U.S. and British 
intelligence agencies were instrumental in halting the development of a Libyan nuclear 
weapon.  They had penetrated the Khan network and learned the extent of Qadhafi’s 
nuclear ambitions.  Intelligence work then led to the interdiction of key elements of the 
Libyan program and publicly disclosed them to the world.  The comprehensive picture of 
exactly what Western intelligence knew about its nuclear and missile programs finally 
convinced Qadhafi and his regime that they should abandon WMD and come back into 
the international community.  Furthermore, intelligence agents were directly involved in 
the final negotiations between Libya and the West.  Thus, intelligence work from 2000 to 
2003 is labeled as highly effective.  Western intelligence agencies succeeded in 
penetrating Libyan supply networks, interdicting key WMD components, and playing the 
part of covert diplomats that convinced the Libyans they should give up on WMD. 
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d. Finding 2:  Intelligence work was significant in persuading 
Libya to renounce its WMD 
The combination of both the moderate effectiveness of intelligence work 
in the 1980s and 1990s, and the high effectiveness of recent Western counter-
proliferation efforts rooted in intelligence leads me to conclude that intelligence was 
significant in persuading Libya to renounce its WMD programs.  The Western 
intelligence community formulated an accurate assessment of Libyan actions and 
programs.  Quality intelligence products moved other nations to join the United States in 
punishing Libyan terrorism and proliferation by consistently highlighting Qadhafi’s 
transgressions.  Finally, intelligence actions allowed the United States to be proactive in 
ultimately halting the Libyan nuclear program. 
3. Coercive Diplomacy 
Throughout its tenuous relationship with the Qadhafi regime, the United States 
made several attempts at coercive diplomacy against Libya.  These ranged from subtle 
threats to a full-scale military raid.  The effectiveness and significance of these attempts 
is discussed below. 
a. The 1980s 
The 1980s represent the time period in which U.S. coercive diplomacy 
attempts were the most prominent and focused towards Qadhafi.  The objectives of this 
period of coercive diplomacy were to both ensure that the Libyans could not claim the 
Gulf of Sidra as their own and continue pressure for Qadhafi to end his support of 
terrorism.  Although it took about nine years, there were no more challenges to the 
American claims of Freedom of Navigation after 1989.   
 The objective of keeping pressure on Qadhafi for his support of terrorism is more 
difficult to qualify as a success or failure.  Certainly, Qadhafi realized that American 
presence inside the “line of death” was more than just an exercise in enforcing the law of 
the sea.  Also, the direct U.S. attack on Libyan soil showed the Libyan leader that the 
United States was serious about him ending state-sponsored terrorism.  However, two of 
Libya’s worst terrorist attacks, Pan Am and UTA, followed the operation.  At the most, 
this period of coercive diplomacy served to constantly remind Qadhafi that the United 
States was watching him and growing more and more aggrieved at his foreign policy.  
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Thus, the coercive diplomacy efforts of the 1980s are labeled as slightly effective.  They 
did not stop Libyan terrorism or the regime’s pursuit of WMD.  They did however 
demonstrate U.S. will, and this must have factored into decisions made by Qadhafi. 
b. The 1990s 
In the 1990s, U.S. coercive diplomacy efforts were meager at best.  In the 
cases of the two Libyan chemical weapons plants at Rabta and Tarhunah, U.S. threats 
varied greatly.  In the Rabta case, only the slightest of threats were made before the 
administration of the time resorted to diplomatic measures.  The U.S. was capable of 
destroying the plant, but most likely lacked the political will.  The Tarhunah case is 
different.  Representatives of the Clinton Administration made very vocal threats towards 
the new plant.  In fact, these included thinly-veiled threats of tactical nuclear weapons.  
With a huge negative public response to these threats, the United States quickly resorted 
to other measures such as the ILSA.  Negative world opinion brought into question the 
will of policy-makers.  Furthermore, the United States most likely could not have 
destroyed the plant even if it wanted to, meaning it did not have the capability.  For these 
reasons, coercive diplomacy in the 1990s is labeled as non-effective.  Although coercive 
diplomacy attempts directly targeted Libyan WMD programs, they did not possess the 
credibility to be successful. 
c. 2000-2003 
This era marks a huge transition in U.S. foreign policy.  After the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001, the current administration shifted to a policy towards 
WMD which included preemption as a viable option.  WMD proliferation was presented 
as justification for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Certainly, the Iraqi invasion 
showed the world that the United States would not tolerate proliferation of WMD.  
However, the available evidence suggests that the United States was more interested in 
engaging Libya on WMD rather than threatening it.  There is a distinct lack of overt 
threats directed towards Libya over its WMD efforts.  The fact that Libya approached 
Western intelligence the day before the invasion of Iraq seems to be coincidental.  CIA 
testimony and reports point out that Libya was suffering under isolation and wanted a 
return of foreign investment, technology and expertise.  I can only speculate on whether 
intelligence units used the Iraqi example in negotiations with Qadhafi and his regime.  
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Certainly, this would add weight to U.S. persuasive efforts, but engagement and coercive 
diplomacy are on opposite ends of the foreign policy spectrum.  Thus, U.S. coercive 
diplomacy towards Libyan WMD is labeled slightly effective.  Bush’s National Security 
Strategy and the invasion of Iraq probably had a “bonus coercive effect.”135  The effects 
of other U.S. policies towards Libya were more influential, but the blanket threats of the 
Bush Administration slightly influenced Qadhafi’s calculus. 
d. Finding 3:  Coercive Diplomacy was not significant in Libya’s 
decision to renounce WMD 
The relationship between U.S. coercive diplomacy attempts towards Libya and its 
decision to give up WMD suggests this tool was slightly effective at best.  During the 
1980s, U.S. coercive diplomacy efforts aimed to end Libyan support of terrorism.  While 
they did not stop terrorism, they showed Qadhafi that the U.S. was willing to use some 
military force to counter wayward Libyan foreign policy.  In the 1990s, U.S. coercive 
diplomacy attempts did nothing to influence Qadhafi.  Their haphazard and random 
application showed a lack of both will and capability.  Essentially, these efforts lacked 
the necessary credibility.  The coercive diplomacy attempts of the current administration 
did not apply directly to Libya.  For lack of a better term, I call these efforts blanket 
coercive diplomacy.  While they may have factored in to Libya’s cost/benefit analysis, 
they were far from decisive.  Thus, the cumulative effects of coercive diplomacy 
targeting Qadhafi and Libya were not significant. 
4. Summary 
The three major external strategies to influence Libya’s WMD proliferation were 
sanctions and diplomacy, intelligence and coercive diplomacy.  All of these strategies 
were applied toward Qadhafi and his regime throughout the last three decades.  However, 
only two of them were significant in persuading Libya to renounce its WMD. 
a. Finding 4:  Sanctions and diplomacy as well as good intelligence 
work were the major significant external factors in Libya’s 
renunciation of WMD 
Twenty-five years of comprehensive unilateral and multilateral sanctions 
and diplomatic isolation severely degraded the internal and international reputation of 
Qadhafi’s regime.  Their continuous application weakened Qadhafi and, in time, created 
                                                 
135 Jamie Ann Calbrese, “Carrots or Sticks?  Libya and U.S. Efforts to Influence Rogue States,” Strategic 
Insights 11, no. 3 (November 2004). 
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the conditions which were necessary for Libya to acquiesce on its plans to continue to 
develop WMD.  Once these conditions developed, U.S. engagement and intelligence 
work were able to exploit the internal situation in Libya.  The use of positive inducements 
showed Qadhafi that he could stay in power and better his country if he abandoned 
WMD.  Counter-proliferation efforts by Western intelligence agencies proved to Libya 
that it would not be allowed to continue with WMD proliferation.  The combination of 
these factors sufficiently persuaded Qadhafi that it was more beneficial and less costly to 
rejoin the international community and bring in much needed foreign investment rather 
than pursue WMD. 
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The Libyan case is significant because it marks the first time a country viewed as 
a rogue state has voluntarily given up both sponsorship of terrorism and WMD programs.  
The obvious hope is that the lessons-learned from the Libyan case can be applied to other 
rogue nations or potential proliferators.  For this reason, it was necessary to catalogue 
which influence strategies were significant and those that were not.  With these findings, 
I can now discuss their implications in a broader policy perspective. 
1. Implication 1:  Lessons from the Libyan case are not comprehensively 
applicable to more highly motivated proliferators such as Iran and 
North Korea 
Many scholars and policy-makers may want to apply the success of the Libyan 
experience to nations such as Iran and North Korea.  However, the nature of Libya is 
different.  On the proliferation spectrum, Libya resides on the more easily influenced side 
for several reasons.  First, Libya is, and has always been, completely dependent on oil 
revenues to support its economy.  However, its strategic importance as an oil-producing 
nation is far outweighed by oil powerhouses such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran.  
Comprehensive unilateral and multilateral sanctions targeting the Libyan oil industry 
were possible because the world did not rely heavily on Qadhafi and his country to 
supply it.  The fact that Libyan oil is of excellent quality and the country’s geographic 
location makes its exports highly desirable to the United States and Europe.  However, 
Western countries have never relied upon its supply.   
Second, Libya is not, and never was, a technologically advanced country.  While 
the country is fairly educated, it is not technologically self-sustaining.  Throughout its 
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history of pursuing WMD, Libya relied almost exclusively on foreign expertise.  When 
Western sources disappeared, it was forced to turn east and open itself to exploitation by 
good intelligence work. 
Third, Qadhafi’s regime, while extremely authoritarian, relies upon the economy 
to placate its population with social benefits.  This is a main source of the regime’s 
power.  Cutting off oil revenue severely jeopardized Qadhafi’s position.  Policy tools 
besides the threat of military force were thus able to sufficiently influence Libya. 
Finally, the United States and its allies had plenty of time to allow different 
influence strategies to show effectiveness.  The lack of indigenous expertise and ease of 
isolating the nation allowed the West to sit back and wait until Libya was ripe for 
engagement and exploitation. 
Iran is similar to Libya in that it is extremely dependent on its oil revenue and 
foreign investment in the oil industry. However, Iran is different than Libya in a few key 
areas.  First, Iran’s WMD programs are much more advanced than those of Libya.136  
There is not the same amount of time available to allow these policy tools to work.  
Furthermore, the technological education of Iran is at a much higher level than Libya.  
Additionally, the Iranians have gone to great lengths to conceal their WMD programs.  It 
may be an impossible task to highlight their WMD transgressions as was done with the 
Libyans.  Iran is also a major supplier of oil to Europe and Asia.  It is foolish to hope that 
the international community will decide to place multilateral sanctions on Iran.  The cost 
of these sanctions for many countries would far outweigh the benefits.  Additionally, 
there is probably no good military option for countering Iran.  We do not know enough 
about their programs to accurately target their WMD.  Furthermore, U.S. involvement in 
Iraq severely degrades U.S. military capability against other rogue nations. 
North Korea does not depend on oil for its livelihood.  In fact, it is very difficult 
to learn anything about the isolated and extremely closed nation.  Like Iran, North Korea 
is much more technologically advanced in its WMD programs.  They do not have to rely 
on foreign suppliers to the extent of Libya and are therefore much less susceptible to 
interdiction.  Finally, the reasons for North Korean and Iranian proliferation may be far 
 
136 NS4285, Class notes, Naval Postgraduate School, Winter Quarter, 2005. 
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different than those of Libya.  While Libya did make progress towards viable chemical 
and nuclear programs, it probably did not view them as absolutely essential to national 
security.  The opposite seems to be true in Iran and North Korea.   
2. Implication 2:  Lessons from the Libyan case can be applied to other 
potential proliferators 
While Iran and North Korea cannot be treated the same as Libya, other nations 
can.  Countries that are considering proliferation can be targets of the sanctions, 
intelligence and threats that influenced Libya.  Nations with little indigenous technical 
expertise and highly dependent on foreign investment are good candidates for the types 
of influence strategies employed against Libya.  Additionally, those nations that think 
WMD might increase their international importance, such as Sudan, but do not consider 
them vital may also be good candidates. 
3. Implication 3:  The effective use of intelligence agencies in counter-
proliferation scenarios is very important 
The Libyan case shows us that Western intelligence can be very effective beyond 
its traditional roles of collecting and analyzing information for policy-makers.  Decision-
makers can use intelligence in a persuasive manner.  Merely collecting intelligence on 
WMD supply networks will not stop proliferation.  The United States must be willing to 
devote proper human and technical resources to penetrating and influencing these 
networks.  This effort will take considerable amounts of time, money, and persistence, 
but the Libyan case shows that it will be beneficial.  In this manner, we are in a position 
to stop proliferation and not merely observe how it occurs.  While some countries may be 
past this point, others are ripe for exploitation. 
D. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In addition to the policy implications discussed above, the Libyan case produces 
two important theoretical questions which merit further study.  These are discussed 
below. 
1. Theoretical Question 1:  What is the value of placing additional 
unilateral sanctions on top of existing multilateral sanctions? 
Most scholars agree that multilateral sanctions are more effective than unilateral 
ones.  Certainly, the body of evidence suggests this.  However, the Libyan case suggests 
that U.S. unilateral sanctions were still effective even when UN sanctions were lifted.  I 
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explain in Chapter II that one of the reasons is the Libyan dependence on U.S. oil 
technology, expertise and business practices.  It would be worthwhile for further studies 
to research how applicable these types of sanctions would be against other countries.  The 
ILSA added WMD renunciation as a requirement to the suspension of sanctions already 
existing targeting Libya.  Future research should probe whether adding additional 
compliance terms to sanctions regimes will have the desired effect on the target nation. 
2. Theoretical Question 2:  What is the effectiveness of Blanket Coercive 
Diplomacy? 
All academic research on coercive diplomacy has been conducted on cases where 
one nation uses this strategy against another.  The National Security Strategy and WMD 
Strategy of the United States are examples of coercive diplomacy attempts.  However, 
they target several nations.  Policymakers need research which explores this question in 
detail.  If blanket threats are sufficient, then the job of U.S. policymakers becomes easier.  
I have concluded from the Libyan case, that these threats were not significant in Libya’s 
decision.  Additionally, the current U.S. involvement in Iraq may undermine blanket 
threats.  How can other nations be expected to take U.S. threats seriously when our 
situation in Iraq has the military bogged down?  I do not think that coercive diplomacy 
should never be used.  On the contrary, it can be highly beneficial.  However, I do not 
think that many decision-makers understand the implications of their threats.  It is 
essential that we understand the implications of blanket threats before our preemptive 
policy is put into further practice. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Libya’s 2003 decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction was a great 
moment for the international community.  It showed the world that one nation realized 
that it did not need to pursue proliferation to become an influential member of the global 
society.  We cannot, however, content ourselves with this piece of history.  Proliferation 
remains a great threat to the world, and any successful cases of preventing it must be 
analyzed and dissected to provide valuable lessons that apply to other cases. I have 
concluded that the use of sanctions and diplomacy and intelligence significantly 
influenced the Libyan renunciation of WMD.  This conclusion may not be helpful in 
combating Iranian and North Korean proliferation due to the nature of their programs.  
However, the broader implications of the Libyan case can be applied to other countries.  
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It does not provide an irrefutable roadmap to stop proliferation, but it does give valuable 
insight to policy-makers on what types of influence strategies are effective in certain 
situations.   
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